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INTRODUCTION
What are the responsibilities of a prosecutor when she learns in the
course of preparing for trial that defense counsel has a potential conflict
of interest? Must the prosecutor alert defense counsel and the trial
judge to the problem? May she move to disqualify defense counsel?
If a prosecutor were no different from any other trial lawyer, the
answers would be fairly simple. As a general rule, a lawyer is not her
"brother's keeper." ' She has no obligation to anticipate and prevent
opposing counsel's errors, whether of law, of tactics, or of ethics; to
the contrary, it is a customary aspect of skilled advocacy to exploit
opposing counsel's missteps. 2 Accordingly, in civil cases, a trial law-
yer is ordinarily entitled to remain silent when opposing counsel has
merely a potential conflict of interest. 3 A civil trial lawyer generally
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1. As the District Court noted in In re Timmerman, 26 F. Supp. 600, 600 (D. Or. 1939),
there is no record that Cain's question-"Am I my brother's keeper?"-was ever answered. See
also Furr v. Spring Grove State Hosp., 53 Md. App. 474, 475, 454 A.2d 414, 414 (1983).
2. In contrast, a lawyer may have a responsibility to ensure that his associates or partners
conform to the rules of professional conduct. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
stmrrY, DR 2-103, 4-101()) & 7-107(J) (1981); id., EC 1-4, 3-8, 3-9, 4-2, 4-5, & 6-2; MODEL
RuLEs OF PRorassIoNAL CoNDucr, Rule 5.1 (1987). The Model Rules have been adopted by
slightly more than half the states; the Code remains in effect in the other states.
3. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1379 (1976)
(Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility does not require an
advocate to disclose opposing counsel's potential conflict); see generally Comment, The Ethics of
Moving to Disqualify Opposing Counsel for Conflict of Interest, 1979 DuKE L.J. 1310, 1318-19;
but see In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1976) ("When an attorney discovers a possible
ethical violation concerning a matter before a court, he is not only authorized but is in fact
obligated to bring the problem to that court's attention."). There may be a greater responsibility
in class action litigation, however, since the class members will not be bound by an adverse
decision if their attorney had a conflict of interest. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45
(1940).
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has no duty to alert the court until opposing counsel becomes embroiled
in an actual conflict of interests amounting to a disciplinary violation. 4
A prosecutor's role in the adversary process has traditionally
been regarded quite differently from that of most other trial lawyers.
Although the courts and the organized bar often stress the responsibility
that all trial lawyers owe to the court and to society in general,5 prose-
cutors are held to a particularly high standard. As a representative of
the government, a prosecutor has an interest in the rendition of just ver-
dicts, and a corresponding responsibility to ensure that a criminal defen-
dant is not unjustly convicted and that the proceedings leading up to a
conviction are fair. These responsibilities have been recognized by
both the judiciary and the organized bar. In Berger v. United States,6
for example, the Supreme Court placed particular emphasis on the pros-
ecutor's duty to ensure the fairness of the outcome of a criminal pro-
ceeding:
4. Under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, an advocate is required to alert
the court to ethical misconduct which is known to have been committed by another lawyer.
Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-103(A) of the Code provides that "[a] lawyer possessing unprivileged
knowledge of [a lawyer's misconduct] shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority
empowered to investigate or act upon such violation." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPON.
SIBILrrY (1981). See also Ethical Consideration (EC) 1-4 ("The integrity of the profession can be
maintained only if conduct of lawyers in violation of the Disciplinary Rules is brought to the atten-
tion of the proper officials. A lawyer should reveal voluntarily to those officials all unprivileged
knowledge of conduct of lawyers which he believes clearly to be in violation of the Disciplinary
Rules."). Id.
Therefore, under the Code a lawyer may be obliged to alert the court when she knows that
opposing counsel has an actual conflict of interest which is clearly proscribed by the Code. See,
e.g., In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265-66 (5th Cir. 1976) (a lawyer has a duty under DR
1-103(A) to apprise the trial court of opposing counsel's actual conflict); Estates Theatres, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc., 345 F. Supp. 93, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see generally Comment,
supra note 3, at 1317-18.
A lawyer probably would not be obliged to make disclosure under the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct; however, unlike the Code, the Model Rules limit the circumstances in which
a lawyer must disclose another lawyer's misconduct. Model Rule 8.3(a) provides that "[a] lawyer
having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of the rules of professional con-
duct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr (1987). It is doubtful that representing conflicting interests at trial raises"a substantial question as to [the other] lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness." Moreover,
Model Rule 8.3 requires disclosure only to a disciplinary body, rather than to the trial court. Id.
Some states, such as Massachusetts, have declined to adopt DR 1-103(A), Model Rule 8.3,
or an equivalent rule. Moreover, critics of the so-called "snitch rule" point out that even where
the rule is in effect, it is often violated and almost never enforced. See generally Marks &
Catheart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193;
but see In re Himmel, 125 II1. 2d 531, 533 N.E.2d 790 (1988)(suspending attorney for one year
for failing to report the misconduct of another attorney who converted his client's funds).
5. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professionalism, "In the Spirit of Public Service: A
Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism," 10 (1986) ("The practice of law in the
spirit of a public service can and ought to be the hallmark of the legal profession.") (quoting
R. POuND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTiQurry TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953)).
6. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
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[The prosecutor] is a representative not of an ordinary party to
a controversy, but of a sovereign whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not
that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. 7
Some years later, in Donnelly v. DeChristofo,8 Justice Douglas,
stressed the prosecutor's duty to guarantee the fairness of the process by
which a criminal conviction is obtained. He observed that the prose-
cutor's "function is to vindicate the right of people as expressed in the
laws and give those accused of crime a fair trial. "9 Moreover, the duty
to promote the fairness of criminal proceedings includes, as a corollary,
a duty to avoid the public perception that criminal proceedings are
unfair.10
A prosecutor has also been characterized as "an administrator of
justice' '1 who has an affirmative responsibility to promote the orderly,
efficient administration of criminal justice. This responsibility
includes, among other things, a duty to avoid missteps that will result
in reversals of criminal convictions and necessitate retrials.1 2
Although the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (1972) rec-
ognizes that, as a general matter, "[tjhe responsibility of a public pros-
ecutor differs from that of the usual advocate," ' 13 it does not explain
how the different responsibilities are implicated when opposing counsel
has a potential conflict of interest. Nothing in the Code indicates that,
in responding to his adversary's potential conflict, a prosecutor might
have a different, and greater, responsibility than her civil counterpart. 14
7. Id. at 88. Accord Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 107 S. Ct. 2124, 2135 (1987)
(plurality opinion of Brennan, J.); CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETMcs, Canon 5 (1908) ("The pri-
mary responsibility of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see that
justice is done."); see generally Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual
Framework, 15 Am. J. Crim. L. 197 (1988).
8. 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 649.
10. See Patterson v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2404 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution
Function, Standard 3-1.1(b) (2d ed. Feb. 1979).
12. Similarly, a prosecutor has a responsibility to ensure that criminal charges are resolved
promptly, id., Standard 3-2.9, and to give appropriate regard to the interest of judicial economy
in exercising discretion with respect to such matters as whether defendants should be jointly
charged or multiple charges should be brought in a single indictment.
13. MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSlBILTY, EC 7-13 (1972).
14. In addition to DR 1-103(A), two other general provisions of the Code are potentially
relevant. The first, DR 7-103(B) recognizes that, in some respects, prosecutors have a greater
responsibility than other lawyers to disclose information that is helpful to the opposing party. It
requires a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence as well as evidence which tends to mitigate
the alleged offense or justify a reduction in punishment. But nothing in the rule requires a prose-
cutor to disclose information relating to the quality of defense counsel's representation. Accord
AM. J. CRIM. LAW Vol. 16:323 (1989)
Unlike the Code, the more recent ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (1983) do specifically recognize the prosecutor's responsibility
in conflict-of-interest cases, but they address it only superficially,
recommending that a prosecutor exercise "caution" in deciding
whether to object to counsel's representation. 15 The failure to address
this problem at any greater length is somewhat surprising, since the
lawyers' codes have traditionally focused on the conduct of trial law-
yers, 16 with particular emphasis on conflicts of interest. 17 Moreover,
the need for some kind of guidance is ever increasing, as courts and
commentators continue to express concern that motions to disqualify
opposing counsel based on conflicts of interest may be used to obtain an
unfair tactical advantage in both criminal 18 and civil cases.19
ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The Prosecution Function,
Standard 3-3.11 (2d ed. Feb. 1979); Model Rule 3.8(d).
The second relevant provision, DR 7-102(A)(1), provides that a lawyer should not take
action merely to harass the opposing party. This rule has occasionally been applied to prosecutors.
See, e.g., In re Rook, 276 Or. 695, 556 P.2d 1351 (1976) (refusal to plea bargain with par-
ticular defendant violated disciplinary rule). It would forbid a prosecutor from moving to
disqualify defense counsel simply for purposes of harassment. But nothing in this rule or
elsewhere in the Code establishes when a prosecutor may legitimately file a disqualification
motion.
15. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT, Rule 1.7, comment (1983).
16. See, e.g., C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 54 and n.26 (1986).
17. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-101 to 5-107 (1972); MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.7 to 1.12 (1983).
18. See, e.g., Margolin & Coliver, Pretrial Disqualification of Criminal Defense Counsel,
20 AM. Cans. L. Rav. 227, 229 (1982); WOLFRAM, supra note 16 at 318 n.21; see also Genego,
Prosecutorial Control Over a Defendant's Choice of Counsel, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 17, 19-20
(1987).
19. See, e.g., Trinity Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. G&L Ambulance Serv., Inc., 578 F. Supp.
1280, 1282-83 & n.7 (D. Conn. 1984); Bayer & Abrahams, The Ethics for Moving for Dis-
qualification of Opposing Counsel, 13 CoLO. LAW. 55 (1984); Chapman, Disqualification of
Attorneys-A Critical Analysis, 30 TRIAL LAWYER'S GUImE 456, 491-2 (1986); Note, Federal
Courts and Attorney Disqualification Motions: A Realistic Approach to Conflicts of Interest,
62 WASH. L. REv. 863, 873-75 (1987). Disqualification motions may be used in civil cases
for various strategic purposes, such as to obtain delay, see, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin,
625 F.2d 433, 437 (2d Cir.) (en bane), vacated, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981), or to deprive the
opposing party of a particularly good lawyer. See, e.g., Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc.,
478 F.2d 562, 574 (2d Cir. 1973). In many civil cases, the party moving for disqualification
has no legitimate interest of its own at stake but purports to advance the interests of the party
opposing disqualification. In such cases, courts typically recognize the moving party's "standing"
to raise the alleged conflict. See, e.g., Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085
(3rd Cir.) cert. denied 429 U.S. 830 (1976); Duca v. Raymark Indus., 663 F. Supp. 184,
188 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Black v. State of Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848, 861-62 (W.D. Mo. 1980);
Rice v. Baron, 456 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); but see In re Yarn Processing Patent Valid-
ity Litigation, 530 F.2d 83, 88 (5th Cir.) reh'g denied 536 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1976) ("As
a general rule, courts do not disqualify an attorney on the grounds of conflict of interest unless
the former client moves for disqualification.").
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In the past few years, the judiciary has begun to address some of
the questions that have been left unanswered by the organized bar. Pur-
suant to their supervisory authority over attorneys who practice before
them, 20 a small number of courts have given prosecutors explicit
instructions about how to proceed when they learn that defense counsel
may have a conflict. 21 Other courts have given guidance to prosecutors
indirectly by expressing disapproval of particular prosecutorial conduct
that has come to their attention. 22 The judicial effort to define the pros-
ecutor's role has been complicated by the recognition that, while a
prosecutor has an ethical duty much like that of the court itself, the
prosecutor has potentially conflicting responsibilities and interests aris-
ing out of her role as an advocate in the adversary process. 23
This Article explores the responsibilities that courts have begun to,
and ought to, impose on prosecutors. In large part, the prosecutor's
responsibilities are subordinate to those of defense counsel and the trial
judge, who have the primary responsibility to ensure that the defen-
dant's right to independent counsel is not unfairly abridged. Therefore,
as background to a discussion of the prosecutor's role, Part I discusses
the roles of defense counsel and of the trial judge in cases in which
defense counsel has a potential conflict of interest.
Part I then explores the scope and nature of the prosecutor's ethi-
cal responsibility in cases in which defense counsel has a potential con-
flict of interest. In particular, it considers whether a prosecutor has a
duty to disclose the potential conflict to defense counsel and to the trial
judge, and whether, in addition, a prosecutor must move, or refrain
from moving, to disqualify defense counsel. Part II discusses these
20. It has long been recognized that courts have inherent authority to regulate the practice of
lawyers who appear before them. See generally In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985); Howell v.
State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205, 206-07 (5th Cir.) reh'g denied 424 U.S. 936 (1976); Dowling,
The Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A. J. 635 (1935); Green, The Courts' Power Over
Admission and Disbarment, 4 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1925); Jeffers, Government of the Legal Profes-
sion: An Inherent Judicial Power Approach, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 385 (1978); Note, Legislative or
Judicial Control of Attorneys, 8 FOROHAM L. REv. 103 (1939); Note, The Inherent Power of the
Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of Law-A Proposed Delineation, 60 MiNN. L. REv. 783
(1986).
21. See, e.g., Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 583-84 (9th Cir.) cert. denied 109 S. Ct.
260 (1988); United States v. Holley, 826 F.2d 331, 333 (5th Cir.); United States v. Iorizzo, 786
F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1986); United States ex rel. Vriner v. Hedrick, 500 F. Supp. 977, 983 (C.D.
Ill. 1980); People v. Mattison, 494 N.E.2d 1374, 1378-9, 67 N.Y.2d 462, 471 (1986).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 572 F. Supp. 709, 713, 716 (N.D. Cal. 1983),
affd, 736 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985).
23. See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980) (In the adversary system,
prosecutors need not be entirely "neutral and detached," but must necessarily be zealous in their
enforcement of the law.) (quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 62 (1972)).
AM. J. CRIM. LAW
questions in the context of four criminal cases in which the prosecutor
undertook different courses of conduct after learning in advance of trial
that the defendant's attorney might have a conflict of interest. The
Article argues that, unlike a civil litigator, a criminal prosecutor has a
duty to disclose defense counsel's potential conflict to both the defense
attorney and to the trial judge. In addition, a prosecutor has a duty to
seek a judicial hearing at which the defendant would either waive his
constitutional right to conflict-free representation or agree to be
represented by an attorney who does not have a potential conflict. Part
II considers and rejects arguments in favor of a more limited ethical
role for prosecutors.
Finally, Part I examines two unsettled, and largely unexplored,
questions: first, does the prosecution have a responsibility to cooperate
in eliminating conflicts of interest which would otherwise necessitate
defense counsel's disqualification; and second, under what circum-
stances is it proper for a prosecutor to seek defense counsel's disqual-
ification notwithstanding the defendant's willingness to waive conflict-
of-interest claims? The Article argues that, in certain cases, the
prosecutor should cooperate to eliminate conflicts even though they
were not deliberately manufactured by the prosecution. It also argues
that disqualification motions should be limited to those cases in which
(a) the defendant's waiver may not be valid; (b) the defense attorney is
so likely to have a serious conflict of interest that his representation
may undermine the appearance that the trial is being conducted fairly
and ethically; or (c) the government has legitimate interests which may
be impaired by defense counsel's conflict of interest. The Article pro-
poses that, in order to minimize the appearance that disqualification
motions are being used to obtain an unfair tactical advantage, prose-
cutors' offices should adopt and comply with guidelines which impose
these limitations on the use of disqualification motions.
I. BACKGROUND: THE ROLE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL
AND THE TRIAL JUDGE
A. Defense Counsel's Ethical Responsibility
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to receive the repre-
sentation of an independent attorney. 24 In a criminal case, defense
counsel's independence may be compromised in a variety of ways. It
has long been recognized, for example, that when a defense lawyer rep-
24. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 3114 (1987); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335




resents two or more jointly charged defendants, there is a significant
risk that the lawyer will be unable to adequately serve the interests of
both defendants. 25 A conflict of interest may also arise in a criminal
case when a defense attorney has an uncharged client whose interests
are contrary to those of the accused, 26 when a defense lawyer is called
upon to cross-examine another client27 or a former client, 28 when a
defense lawyer has personal knowledge that might make him a useful
witness on behalf of his client, 29 or when a defense lawyer is himself
the subject of a criminal investigation. 30
Defense counsel has the principal responsibility for ensuring that
the defendant's right to independent counsel is respected. 31 This
25. See, e.g., Cole, Time for a Change: Multiple Representation Should Be Stopped, 2 J.
CRaI. DEFENSE 149 (1976); Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of
Interest and the Professional Responsibility of the Defense Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REv. 119
(1978); Girgenti, Problems of Joint Representation of Defendants in Criminal Cases, 54 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 55 (1979); Hyman, Joint Representation of Multiple Defendants in a Criminal
Trial: The Court's Headache, 5 HOFSTRA L. REv. 315 (1977); Lowenthal, Joint Representation in
Criminal Cases: A Critical Appraisal, 64 VA. L. RFv. 939 (1978); Moore, Conflicts of Interest in
the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Clients: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion
and Controversy, 61 TEx. L. REv. 211 (1982); Tague, Multiple Representation and Conflicts of
Interest in Criminal Cases, 67 GEO. L.J. 1075 (1979); Note, Conflict of Interests in Multiple Rep-
resentation of Criminal Co-Defendants, 68 CRIM. L. & C. 226 (1977); Note, Criminal Codefen-
dants and the Sixth Amendment: The Case for Separate Counsel, 58 GEO. L.J. 369 (1969);
Developments-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 -ARv. L. REv. 1244, 1373-96
(1981).
26. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981).
27. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1692 (1988).
28. See, e.g., United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Martinez, 630 F.2d 361, 363-4 (5th Cir.)
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 922 (1981); United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591, 593 (2d
Cir. 1975); United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256, 1265 (7th Cir.) cert denied, 423 U.S. 1066
(1976); United States v. Calabria, 614 F. Supp. 187, 192 (E.D. Pa. 1985); United States v. Jones,
623 F. Supp. 110, 113-4 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Tocco, 575 F. Supp. 100, 102 (N.D.
IlI.-E.D. 1983); United States v. Siegner, 498 F. Supp. 282, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Matter of
Investigative Grand Jury Proceedings on April 6, 1977, 432 F. Supp. 50, 54 (W.D. Va. 1977);
see generally Goldberg, The Former Client's Disqualification Gambit: A Bad Move in Pursuit of
an Ethical Anomaly, 72 MINN. L. REv. 227 (1987); Lowenthal, Successive Representation by
Criminal Lawyers, 93 YALE L.J. 1 (1983).
29. See, e.g. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSnBILITY, DR 5-102(A); United States
v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1151 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); cf. United States v. Arrington, 867 F.2d 122
(2d Cir. 1989); United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 35 (2d Cir. 1984).
30. See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 136 (3d Cir. 1984);
United States v. Salinas, 618 F.2d 1092, 1093 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 961 (1980); In
re Investigation Before Feb., 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652, 656-57 (4th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Kerlegon, 690 F. Supp. 541, 545 (W.D. La. 1988).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Aiello, 814 F.2d 109, 110 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Because defense
counsel are best positioned to know when a conflict exists or will likely develop during the course
of trial, the initial responsibility for preventing the erosion of a client's rights rests on the lawyer's
shoulders.").
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responsibility arises out of the lawyers' codes of professional conduct, 32
which have always emphasized an attorney's duty to represent his client
with unswerving loyalty. 33 An attorney is generally enjoined from
agreeing to defend a client when, to do so, the attorney would have a
conflict of interest which would prevent him from providing an ade-
quate defense. 34
This is not to say, however, that out of an abundance of caution, an
attorney must give up a client whenever there is merely a risk that a
conflict of interest will arise. The lawyers' codes recognize the legiti-
macy of both the attorney's pecuniary interest in securing clients and
the interest of individual litigants in receiving the widest choice of
counsel. The professional norms attempt to strike a balance between
these interests and the interest in providing litigants with adequate rep-
resentation. The line drawn by the lawyers' codes is a somewhat vague
one. Although both the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct define cases in which a lawyer
may never serve conflicting interests, their definitions leave substantial
room for interpretation. 35
The lawyers' codes are more clear in defining the procedure that an
attorney must follow, when he becomes aware of a potential conflict of
interest, in order to accept, or continue in, the representation of a
defendant. Defense counsel must develop the facts needed to assess the
likelihood that a conflict will develop and the likely impact of the con-
flict on the representation. He must decline or withdraw from the rep-
resentation if he determines that he is likely to have a conflict of interest
32. A responsibility to protect a defendant's right to receive conflict-free representation has
also been thought to arise implicitly out of the sixth amendment right to counsel. See, e.g., United
States v. Aiello, 814 F.2d at 110. See generally Note, A Functional Analysis of the Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 80 COLUm. L. REv. 1053, 1081 (1980) (A defense lawyer has a respon-
sibility to protect his client's procedural rights.).
33. All of the codifications of the standards of the legal profession have contained provisions
regarding conflicts of interest. See, e.g., CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL EmIcs, Canon 6 ("It is
unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.") (1908). The contemporary codifications of the professional
standards deal extensively with conflicts of interest. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON.
sIiLrrY, DR 5-101-5-107 (1972); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL. CONDucT, Model Rules 1.7 to
1.11 (1983); see also THE AMERicAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT, Rules 2.1 to 2.5 (rev. draft,
May 1982).
34. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsSILITY, DR 5-105(A),(C); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Model Rule 1.7.
35. E.g., DR 5-105(c) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility allows an attorney
to represent multiple clients, with their consent, "if it is obvious that he can adequately represent
the interests of each." Similarly, Model Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
permits joint representation, upon the consent of both clients, if "the lawyer believes the represen-
tation will not be adversely affected" by the potential conflict of interests.
Vol. 16:323 (1989)
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that is flatly forbidden by the prevailing ethical rules. If, on the other
hand, the ethical rules permit the representation, either because a con-
flict is unlikely to arise, or because the conflict is unlikely to impair the
quality of counsel's performance, defense counsel must advise his client
about the risks that are inherent in the potential conflict. Defense coun-
sel may defend the accused, notwithstanding the potential conflict, if his
client gives consent after full disclosure. 36
B. The Trial Judge's Constitutional Responsibility
For the most part, trial judges rely on defense attorneys to comply
with the prevailing standards governing conflicts of interest. 37 In cer-
tain circumstances, however, when it becomes apparent that defense
counsel may have a conflict of interest, a trial judge has a responsibility
to take steps to protect the defendant's constitutional right to inde-
pendent counsel.
The trial court's responsibility is generally not demanding. When
it appears prior to trial that defense counsel has a real or potential con-
flict of interest, the court has a duty to ascertain whether the accused
will make a voluntary and informed decision to waive his right to an
independent attorney. 38 Although trial judges engage in varying types
of inquiries, 39 the court must ensure at minimum that the accused
understands the general risks created by counsel's potential conflict and
voluntarily accepts them. 40 If the accused cannot or will not proffer a
voluntary and knowing waiver of his sixth amendment right, then
defense counsel must be disqualified and the accused given an oppor-
tunity to obtain another lawyer.
36. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY, Ethical Considerations EC
5-15, 5-16; id., DR 5-105(C); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr, Rule 1.7 and comment
(1983).
37. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1980).
38. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978);
United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 602, 605 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Taylor, 657 F.2d
92, 94 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981).
39. Compare Gray v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 801, 803-04 (5th Cir. 1980) (court of appeals, pur-
suant to its supervisory authority, requires district judges to engage in extensive inquiry); United
States v. Padilla-Martinez, 762 F.2d 942, 946-49 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Randa, 669
F. Supp. 1544, 1550-51 (D. Kan. 1987), with United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382, 1388 (8th
Cir. 1988) ("A judge should inform the defendant of the nature and importance of the right to
conflict-free counsel, and ensure that the defendant understands something of the consequences of
a conflict and his entitlement to conflict-free counsel, but the waiver is not like the signature on
a bond indenture. It is enough that the defendant knows the types of risks at stake and acts 'with
open eyes.' "); United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 890 (2d Cir. 1982).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382 (7th Cir. 1988); United States ex rel.
Tonaldi v. Elrod, 716 F.2d 431, 437 (7th Cir. 1983).
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The trial court is not obliged to accept the defendant's waiver of
independent representation. As the Supreme Court recently determined
in Wheat v. United States, 41 a trial judge may override the defendant's
choice of counsel when there is a serious likelihood that defense counsel
will have a conflict of interest at trial. The Court recognized that a trial
judge has considerable discretion in deciding whether to disqualify a
defense attorney under this standard. 42
II. THE PROSECUTOR'S ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Choice of Nondisclosure
United States v. Mitchell43 illustrates the dangers of a prosecutor's
failure to respond in any way to the risk that defense counsel will have
a conflict of interest.
The defendant in Mitchell was charged with narcotics offenses
including conspiracy to distribute heroin. Shortly before trial, the fed-
eral prosecutor obtained the cooperation of an associate of Mitchell
named Bluitt. The prosecutor was aware that Bluitt had recently been
represented by Mitchell's attorney, West, on criminal charges in state
court. As a consequence, when it came time to cross-examine Bluitt,
defense counsel might be torn between her duty to preserve the confi-
41. 108 S. Ct. 1692 (1988). Accord In re Paradyne Corp., 803 F.2d 604, 611 n.16 (1lth
Cir. 1986); United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 259 (1984); United
States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 828 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 906 (1982) (the right to
counsel of choice "is not absolute . . . and must give way where its vindication would create a
serious risk of undermining public confidence in the integrity of our legal system"); United States
v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 801-02 (6th Cir. 1983) (overruled on other grounds in United States v.
Tosh, 733 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984)); United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198 (3d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980); United
States v. Miller, 613 F.2d 47 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980); United States v. Dolan,
570 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3rd Cir. 1978) (quoted with approval in Wheat v. United States, supra, 108
S. Ct. at 1698-99); cf. United States v. Reese, 699 F.2d 803, 805 (6th Cir. 1983) ("The district
court must make a careful inquiry, balancing the constitutional right of the defendant to representa-
tion by counsel of his choosing with the court's interest in the integrity of its proceedings and the
public's interest in the proper administration of criminal justice .... A voluntary waiver of this
constitutional right, knowingly and voluntarily made, must be honored by the court in the absence
of compelling circumstances.").
42. 108 S. Ct. at 1699-1700; id. at 1704 n. (Stevens, J., dissenting). I criticize the
Wheat decision and discuss its implications for future conflict of interest cases, in an article
titled "Through a Glass, Darkly": How the Courts See Motions to Disqualify Criminal
Defense Lawyers, which is scheduled for publication in October of 1989 by the Columbia Law
Review.
43. 572 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 736 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 830 (1985).
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dences and secrets of her former client44 and her duty to give Mitchell
a vigorous defense. 45 Unless Bluitt waived his right to attorney-client
confidentiality, West could not impeach Bluitt with information learned
during the course of representing him. To avoid the use of those con-
fidences, West might be forced to constrict her cross-examination of
Bluitt, and might thereby deprive her present client, Mitchell, of the
zealous advocacy to which he was entitled.
Although it was obvious that using Bluitt as a government witness
could cause defense counsel to have a conflict of interest, the prosecutor
deliberately did not disclose to the defense in advance of trial that Bluitt
would testify against Mitchell. 46 The prosecutor was motivated prima-
rily by concern for Bluitt's safety. The prosecutor believed that
Mitchell or others might injure Bluitt or interfere with his testimony if
they knew he was cooperating with the government.
When the government disclosed in the midst of trial that Bluitt
would eventually be called as a witness, defense counsel immediately
complained that she would be unable to conduct a vigorous cross-
examination without disclosing Bluitt's confidences. This problem was
solved several days later, when Bluitt agreed to let West make use of
any information that he had previously provided to her during the
course of the attorney-client relationship. A new problem, however,
was created by Bluitt's waiver of the attorney-client privilege. West
would now be a potential defense witness. If Bluitt had made state-
ments to her which exculpated Mitchell, it might be in Mitchell's inter-
est for her to testify about those statements in order to impeach Bluitt.
West could not both testify on Mitchell's behalf and represent him at
trial.47 The defense moved for a mistrial in light of this newly created
conflict and the trial court granted the motion without opposition from
the government. 48
44. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsBILrrY, DR 4-101; MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT, Model Rule 1.6.
45. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
46. The government did submit to the trial court, for in camera review, a federal agent's
declaration which listed the names of more than 200 potential trial witnesses, including Bluitt.
Although the government did not specifically call the court's attention to the potential conflict that
would result if Bluitt testified, the declaration might have enabled the trial court to recognize the
problem. See United States v. Mitchell, 736 F.2d at 1304-05 n.3.
47. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESsIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5- 102(A); United States
v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1137, 1151 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
48. A strong argument may be made that the trial judge granted defense counsel's motion
prematurely. The court could instead have waited until the completion of Bluitt's testimony and
then have required West to make an offer of proof regarding her proposed testimony. It may well
have turned out that defense counsel had no legally admissible testimony to give on Mitchell's
behalf.
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Before Mitchell could be re-tried, the defense moved to dismiss the
indictment on double jeopardy grounds. Among other things, the
defense claimed that the government had been obligated to disclose the
potential conflict in advance of trial and that the government had inten-
tionally breached this obligation for the precise purpose of provoking a
mistrial. 49 The district court rejected the double jeopardy claim, find-
ing that the prosecution's aim was not in fact to cause a mistrial but
simply to protect its witness.50 Nevertheless, while allowing the trial to
begin again, the court did suggest that the prosecution had acted unethi-
cally, if not illegally, in failing to apprise defense counsel of the poten-
tial conflict of interest. The court concluded that, "[a]lthough several
acts of the prosecutors may constitute misconduct, the misconduct was
not so blatant that the Government must have intended it to result in
mistrial." 51
The trial court did not explain, however, why the prosecutor had
any ethical obligation to alert opposing counsel to the potential conflict
of interest. It may be that the court was uncertain about the precise
source of the prosecutor's duty to make disclosure, that it considered
the proper course of prosecutorial conduct to be obvious already, that it
was hesitant to make ex cathedra remarks about prosecutorial ethics, or
that, out of sympathy for the prosecutor or the government, it was
reluctant to condemn the prosecutor's conduct in any greater detail.
The court's reticence may also have reflected its recognition that
the prosecutor's failure to make disclosure in this case had a strong
basis in a legitimate ethical concern for the safety of government wit-
nesses. This duty to protect witnesses exists wholly apart from the gov-
ernment's interests in ensuring that their testimony will be available at
49. As a general rule, the double jeopardy clause of the sixth amendment does not bar a
retrial after the defendant, on his own mistrial motion, brings about the termination of the initial
trial. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93 (1978) ("Such a motion.. . is deemed
to be a deliberate election on [the defendant's] part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or
innocence determined before the first trier of fact."). There is an exception to this general rule,
however, in a case where the prosecutor intentionally acted in a calculated manner with the pur-
pose of provoking the defendant into moving for a mistrial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667,
673 (1982) ("the defendant's valued right to complete his trial before the first jury would be a
hollow shell if the inevitable motion for mistrial were held to prevent a later invocation of the bar
of double jeopardy").
50. 572 F. Supp. at 716; 736 F.2d at 1304-05.
51. 572 F. Supp. at 716; see also id. at 713. On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit viewed
the record much more charitably and interpreted the district judge's opinion in a manner extremely
sympathetic to the prosecution. According to the appellate court, the district judge "conclu[ded]
that the withholding of the witnesses' names was justified" by the prosecution's concern for the
protection of its witnesses. 736 F.2d at 1304-05 (emphasis added). At best, however, the trial
judge concluded simply that the withholding of Bluitt's name was motivated by the prosecution's
concern for its witnesses.
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trial and that other potential witnesses will cooperate in the future.
Along with the right to command the testimony of witnesses52 comes a
reciprocal obligation on the part of the government to take reasonable
steps to protect witnesses from unlawful intimidation.5 3 Indeed, at
times some have argued that prosecutors have not just an ethical obliga-
tion to safeguard witnesses, but a legally enforceable duty, and that a
prosecutor should be required to provide compensation for injuries that
result from her failure to provide reasonable protection.54 In recogni-
tion of the prosecutor's undeniably legitimate concern for the safety of
government witnesses, 55 federal law generally permits a prosecutor to
withhold the names of government witnesses prior to trial.5 6
Notwithstanding the prosecutor's responsibility to his witnesses,
the court in Mitchell clearly was correct in recognizing that the prose-
cutor had a paramount ethical responsibility to alert defense counsel to
the potential conflict.5 7 This responsibility arises out of general ethical
52. See, e.g., Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 588- 89 (1973); United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) ("the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence"); Blair
v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
53. The prosecution's duty to protect its witnesses has gained increasing attention in recent
years. For example, various states have issued "bills of rights" for crime victims and witnesses
which establish a right to be protected from intimidation. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §
215.33(A)(2) (West 1988); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7.69.030(3) (Supp. 1988); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 950.04(3) (West 1982). Similarly, the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982
requires the Attorney General to issue guidelines to ensure, among other things, that witnesses will"routinely receive information on steps that law enforcement officers and attorneys for the
Government can take to protect [them] from intimidation." Pub. L. 97-291, Section 6(a)(2). See
also ABA Guidelines for Fair Treatment of Victims and Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System
(1983).
54. See, e.g., Barbera v. Smith, 654 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 836 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.
1987); Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Balistreri v. Pacifica
Police Dept., 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988); Doe v. Civiletti, 635 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1980).
55. See, e.g., M. GRAHAM, WNEs INTIMIDATION: THE LAW'S RESPONSE 4-5 (1985) (find-
ing that there have been thousands of instances of witness intimidation, including many murders
of prosecution witnesses, particularly in organized crime cases).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Reis, 788 F.2d 54, 58 (1st Cir. 1986); see generally
Imwinkelried, The Worst Surprise of All: No Right to Pretrial Discovery of the Prosecution's
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 247, 268-71 (1987).
57. Disclosure to the defense attorney alone probably will not suffice in a case such as
Mitchell. Unless defense counsel withdraws from the representation on her own initiative, her
client will have to make the decision whether to seek a new lawyer, and in order to make an
informed decision, he will have to be advised about the details of the potential conflict. Moreover,
even if the attorney withdraws voluntarily after learning of the potential conflict, her client may be
entitled to know the basis for the lawyer's decision. Cf. United States v. Duklewski, 567 F.2d 255
(4th Cir. 1977) (defendant was denied right to counsel of choice when judge advised counsel to
withdraw based on information that the judge had received from the prosecutor ax pane); In re
Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1189 (2d Cir. 1983) (it was improper for the trial court to rule on the
government's disqualification motion exparte, because the defendant was entitled to an opportuni-
ty to refute the government's claim).
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obligations of prosecutors to the court and to the criminal accused.
First, in accord with the prosecutor's responsibility to promote the
proper administration of criminal justice, 58 a prosecutor should take
reasonable precautions to minimize the risk of needless relitigation.A9
As the Mitchell case itself illustrates, there is a substantial possibility
that if the defense is not apprised of counsel's conflict of interest until
the middle of trial, a mistrial will result. Had she received pretrial dis-
closure, defense counsel could have advised her client of the potential
conflict and the defendant could have obtained a new lawyer before trial
commenced, thereby averting the need for a re-trial. As it turned out,
the absence of pretrial disclosure did not even serve its intended pur-
pose, since the witness's identity became known well in advance of the
eventual retrial. 60
More importantly, a prosecutor's responsibility to assure the
accused a fair trial61 means, at the very least, that when a prosecutor
has exclusive possession of information that the defendant needs to
know in order to receive a fair trial, the prosecutor has a duty to
disclose that information to the defense. 62 It follows that a prosecutor
has an obligation to call opposing counsel's attention to a potential con-
flict which may impair counsel's performance, so that counsel can take
necessary steps to ensure that her client receives adequate representa-
tion and, ultimately, a fair trial.
Waiting until trial to make such disclosure may place the defendant
in a situation where he must choose to relinquish one or more rights.
The defendant cannot obtain a speedy trial and avoid being placed in
jeopardy a second time unless he waives his right to an independent
attorney and continues to be represented by an attorney with a conflict.
On the other hand, if the defendant wants an attorney who has only the
58. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
59. Cf. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1983).
60. This does not mean that in a case in which the prosecution intends to present the
testimony of a defense lawyer's former client, the prosecutor would never achieve the aim of pro-
tecting the witness's identity by withholding it until mid-trial. Although the prospect of the former
client's testimony will give rise to a potential conflict of interest, it will not always result in an
actual conflict. If the potential conflict is sufficiently insubstantial, the defendant may decline to
seek a mistrial. In a case such as Mitchell, for example, defense counsel may conclude that she
does not possess any confidential information that could be used to impeach her former client or
that there will be no need to impeach the former client because his testimony will not involve
disputed matters. In such a case, defense counsel may reasonably determine that she does not have
an actual conflict of interest and that she can adequately defend her client notwithstanding the
potential conflict, and the defendant may therefore choose to continue the trial with defense
counsel's representation. Cf. United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975).
61. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.




defendant's interests at heart, he must agree to be tried again at some
future date after a new lawyer is called in as a replacement. If the
defendant has retained counsel, this will compound the cost of
representation.
It would be unfair to purposefully place a defendant in this posi-
tion. Moreover, even when a prosecutor is well-intentioned, her failure
to make timely disclosure creates at least an appearance that she is seek-
ing to obtain an unfair advantage from the defendant's dilemma at trial.
To an observer who is unaware of the prosecutor's motivations, it
might appear that the prosecutor sought to benefit from defense
counsel's conflict in any of a variety of ways. For example, if the
defendant continues with the original attorney, the defense may be less
vigorous than it would be if counsel did not have a conflict of interest.
If, as in Mitchell, the defendant moves for a mistrial in order to obtain
a new lawyer, the prosecutor may unfairly benefit at a subsequent
retrial, since defense counsel may have revealed her theory of the case
during her opening statement and cross-examinations. 63
Although there is a tension between the prosecutor's responsibility
to her witnesses and her responsibilities to the defendant and the court,
it is clear that, on balance, the latter responsibilities are ordinarily para-
mount. In other contexts, it has been firmly established that the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial outweighs the government's interest in
protecting the identity of vulnerable witnesses. 64 This does not mean
that the prosecution may neglect the safety of its witnesses. It simply
means that in a case like Mitchell, where the government's prospective
witness was previously represented by the defendant's lawyer, the pros-
ecution must protect its witness in some way other than by withholding
the witness's identity until he is called to testify. The prosecution may
place the witness under protection or take other appropriate steps. 65
63. Cf. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (striking down a state law which pro-
vided that a defendant who wished to testify on his own behalf must take the stand before other
defense witnesses).
64. See, e.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-62 (1957) (where "the disclosure
of an informer's identity . . . is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential
to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege [to withhold an informer's identity] must give
way"); Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("Tampering with
witnesses and subornation of perjury are real dangers, especially in a capital case. But there are
ways to avert this danger without denying defense counsel access to eye witnesses to the events in
suit").
65. The American Bar Association has suggested a number of steps which may be taken to
protect witnesses, including the following:
extra police patrols; temporary or permanent victim/witness relocation; temporary
restraining orders requiring the defendant to maintain a specified geographical distance
from the victim or witness; police hot lines' for intimidation calls; transportation to and
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But, except perhaps in the most extraordinary circumstances, defense
counsel must be apprised of a potential conflict as soon as possible after
indictment, and certainly in advance of trial. 66
B. The Choice of Partial Disclosure
Mannhalt v. Reed67 illustrates that simply apprising defense counsel
of a potential conflict of interest may not be sufficient.
from work, the court, etc.; phone disconnect; mail stop and forward services; phone
traces; and warning the defendant regarding statutory penalties involved in witness intim-
idation.
ABA Guidelines for Fair Treatment of Victims and Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System 9
(1983).
66. Cf. United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Here the govern-
ment foresaw the potential conflict and appropriately brought it to the court's attention."). Some
courts have held that a prosecutor must also apprise defense counsel of a potential conflict that
arises during the course of a pre-indictment investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Turkish, 470
F. Supp. 903, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); cf SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See
generally Tague, Multiple Representation of Targets and Witnesses During a Grand Jury Investiga-
tion, 17 Amt. CRIM. L. Rev. 300 (1980).
A hard case that tests the general rule is the following: Suppose that an individual has
agreed to testify against the defendant, the alleged kingpin of a violent narcotics enterprise.
Neither the defendant nor his attorney-who formerly represented the witness-are aware of the
witness's decision to cooperate with the government. The witness has advised the government that
he has a large extended family and that, if the defendant knew of the witness's agreement with the
government, the defendant would commit violence against those family members in order to dis-
courage the witness from testifying. However, according to the witness, the defendant would be
unlikely to act purely out of vengeance. Therefore, the witness is confident that once he testifies
against the defendant, the defendant will not retaliate against his family.
Under these circumstances, the only wholly satisfactory solution is for the prosecutor to
convince the witness to waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to his statements to the
defendant's lawyer. That would avoid any conflict arising out of defense counsel's duty to
preserve the confidences of a former client.
If the witness is unwilling to waive the attorney-client privilege, there are two unsatisfactory
alternatives to pretrial disclosure. The first is for the prosecutor to move ex parte for defense
counsel's disqualification. It is doubtful, however, that a trial judge could grant the motion
without allowing defense counsel an opportunity to be heard. See supra note 57 (citing cases).
Moreover, in the unlikely event that a trial granted the motion, the exparte order might fail to ac-
complish its purpose of protecting the witness. Depending on the factual context, defense counsel
and the defendant might infer that the reason for the disqualification order.
Another alternative would be to seek counsel's disqualification in camera, but to permit
defense counsel to participate in hearings on the issue on the condition that he not disclose anything
about the hearing to his client. This is unsatisfactory for at least two reasons. First, it is unlikely
that the prosecutor would trust defense counsel not to make disclosure under such circumstances.
Second, it is unlikely that defense counsel would agree to refrain from making disclosure.
Defense counsel could plausibly argue that he has an ethical obligation to discuss the matter with
his client. See, e.g., MODaL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr, Model Rule 1.4. Among other
things, the defendant could not properly waive a potential conflict in the absence of disclosure.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
67. 847 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1988).
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Mannhalt, the defendant, was charged in December 1980 with
soliciting other individuals to commit a string of robberies in King
County, Washington. The county prosecutor's main witness, Morris,
had been arrested on robbery charges two months earlier. After agree-
ing to plead guilty and cooperate with the prosecution, Morris identified
Mannhalt as one of his accomplices. Morris's information led to the
discovery of stolen jewelry in a safe in Mannhalt's donut shop.
In the course of pretrial discovery, the defense received a police
report from November 1980 which listed twelve items about which
Morris had agreed to give information. The eleventh item referred not
to the defendant, but to the defendant's lawyer, Kempton. According
to the cooperating witness, Kempton had purchased a stolen ring with
$1200 in cash and also had purchased a stolen bracelet.
The witness's accusation posed a potential conflict for the defense
attorney. Kempton's personal interest in preventing further revelations
(whether or not truthful) regarding his own allegedly criminal conduct
might conflict with his client's interest in a vigorous defense. In
furtherance of his own penal interests, or simply to avoid embarassing
public disclosures, the attorney might cross-examine the prosecution
witness in a perfunctory manner or give unsound advice to his client
about whether to plead guilty. 68
The accusation might cause the defense lawyer to compromise his
representation in a second and very different respect, in the event that
he was willing to dispute the allegations publicly. Since it is improper
for a lawyer to serve as both an advocate and a witness at trial, 69
Kempton could not call himself as a defense witness to rebut Morris's
account. If Kempton did not withdraw from the representation, he
would deprive Mannhalt of potential impeachment evidence. He might
also be forced to limit both his cross-examination of Morris and his
arguments to the jury in order to avoid appearing to place his own
credibility in issue.70
Although Kempton discussed Morris's accusation with his client,
he did not tell Mannhalt that, as a result of the accusation, he might
have a conflict of interest at trial. Moreover, while recognizing that
Kempton had a potential conflict of interest, the state prosecutor did not
call the problem to the attention of the court. As a consequence, Mann-
halt was never advised either by counsel or by the court that he had a
68. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1074 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984).
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right to an attorney who did not have a conflict of interest and he was
never called upon to waive that right voluntarily.
At trial, the prosecution called Morris as a witness but questioned
him only about Mannhalt, the defendant, and not about Kempton. On
cross-examination, nevertheless, Kempton elicited that he had been
accused of purchasing stolen jewelry and then attempted to prove that
accusation false. In the course of this effort, Kempton became increas-
ingly emotional. He referred to Morris as a liar. Kempton also called
on his own wife, who was seated in the courtroom, to comment about
her jewelry. As Kempton's questioning became increasingly unusual,
the trial judge was led to observe that "[tihings are coming a little
unglued." 71
Mannhalt was convicted. After appealing unsuccessfully to the
state court, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition in which he
asserted a number of claims, including that he had been denied his right
to counsel's undivided loyalties. Although the federal district judge
denied the petition, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Mannhalt
must be afforded a new trial, because his trial attorney had an actual
conflict of interest which adversely affected the quality of his represen-
tation.72
At the end of its discussion, the appellate court warned that it is not
enough to call a possible conflict of interest to defense counsel's atten-
tion, as did the Washington state prosecutor in this case. The prose-
cutor must also call the potential conflict to the attention of the trial
court. The Ninth Circuit noted:
The prosecution here was fully aware before Mannhalt's trial
began of Morris' accusation against Kempton. The prosecu-
tion, therefore, had ample opportunity to bring the potential
conflict to the trial judge's attention and move for disqualifica-
tion if appropriate. Such a process would also have enabled
Mannhalt if he so desired to waive any conflict on the record
after adequate warning. We trust that this opinion will ensure
a pretrial disposition of such conflict of interest issues in thefuture. 73
71. 847 F.2d at 579.
72. The court found that Kempton's conflict may have caused him to withhold sworn
testimony that might otherwise have benefited Mannhalt; it may have caused Kempton to cross-
examine Morris in an overly excited manner; it may have affected Kempton's decision not to elicit
the defendant's own testimony about Morris's accusation; and it may have discouraged Kempton
from pursuing a plea bargain that might have led Mannhalt to implicate Kempton. 847 F.2d
at 581.
73. Id. at 583-84.
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At least three arguments can be made that the Ninth Circuit's pre-
scription is unnecessary and that there was nothing wrong with the pros-
ecution's conduct in the Mannhalt case. First, it may be argued that the
prosecutor had no duty to initiate a judicial inquiry because he was not
responsible for ensuring that the defendant received conflict-free repre-
sentation. This argument finds some support in Strickland v. Washing-
ton,74 the case in which the Supreme Court delineated the scope of the
right to effective assistance of counsel. In the course of its determina-
tion, the Court observed that "[t]he government is not responsible for,
and hence not able to prevent, [defense] attorney errors." ' 75 It may be
argued that this observation reflects the Court's acknowledgement that
prosecutors have no responsibility to take steps, such as the initiation of
judicial inquiries, when it appears that defense counsel may be making
mistakes which will amount to the denial of reasonably effective
representation at trial. If interpreted in this manner, the Court's
remarks would, at the same time, implicitly absolve prosecutors of any
responsibility to initiate an inquiry into defense counsel's potential con-
flict of interest.
This argument is unpersuasive, however. The Court's observation
in Washington should be read as merely an acknowledgement that a
prosecutor usually cannot know that a defendant is receiving ineffective
assistance and, for that reason, a prosecutor usually cannot do anything
to remedy the problem. It is often hard for a prosecutor to identify
ineffective assistance of defense counsel with any degree of certainty
during the course of a trial, in part, because the standard of attorney
competence is a very general one.76 A prosecutor cannot confidently
identify the point at which defense counsel's representation had become
constitutionally defective. Moreover, conduct which seems incompe-
tent in light of information known to the government may nevertheless
be reasonable in light of other information known to defense counsel,
including information provided to counsel in confidence by his client. 77
But this does not mean that a prosecutor may remain silent in those rare
cases when defense counsel's inadequacy is obvious. As the Court rec-
ognized in Cuyler v. Sullivan, "[tihe right to counsel prevents the State
from conducting trials at which persons who face incarceration must
defend themselves without adequate legal assistance. '"78 Therefore,
when it becomes apparent that defense counsel may be denying the
74. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
75. Id. at 693.
76. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689 (1984).
77. See id. at 691.
78. 446 U.S. at 344.
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accused adequate legal assistance, the prosecutor, as a representative of
the State, should take reasonably available steps to remedy the prob-
lem.79
A second argument in defense of the prosecutor's conduct in
Mannhalt is that even if the prosecutor had some duty to protect the
defendant, he adequately carried out that responsibility by apprising the
defense attorney of the facts giving rise to a potential conflict of inter-
est. It was reasonable for the prosecutor to expect defense counsel to
recognize the ethical problem on his own and to take appropriate action.
The prosecutor was entitled to presume that the defense attorney subse-
quently continued in the representation, notwithstanding the potential
conflict, because counsel had obtained the defendant's knowing and vol-
untary consent to a potentially compromised defense.
This argument finds substantial support in a number of Supreme
Court decisions in which it was presumed that defense attorneys will
comply with the ethical rules regarding conflicts of interest. ° For
79. Although this obligation is not recognized by either the Code or the Model Rules, it has
been recognized by commentators and acknowledged by some prosecutors. See Freedman, The
Professional Responsibility of Prosecuting Attorneys, 55 GEo. L.J. 1030, 1039-40 (1967); see
also Fisher, supra note 7, at 222-223. It has also been included in TnH AMERICAN LAWYER'S
CODE OF CotNucr (rev. draft, May 1982). Rule 9.9 of that code provides: "A lawyer serving as
public prosecutor, who knows that a defendant is not receiving or has not received effective
assistance of counsel, shall promptly advise the court, on the record when possible." The
Lawyer's Code of Conduct, which was proposed by the American Trial Lawyer's Association as
an alternative to the Model Rules, has not been adopted in any state, however.
This responsibility has also been recognized by some courts. For example, it was recog-
nized more than four decades ago in Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 889 (1945), one of the earliest decisions concerning the criminal defendant's constitutional
right to effective representation of counsel. In that case, the D.C. Circuit set forth the "farce and
mockery" standard, id. at 669, which was later rejected in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984), as the standard for reviewing the adequacy of defense counsel's performance at trial.
In giving content to the earlier standard, the court stated in Diggs v. Welch that "the absence of
effective representation must be strictly construed" to "mean representation so lacking in com-
petence that it becomes the duty of the court or the prosecution to observe it and correct it." 148
F.2d at 670 (emphasis added). Accord United States ex rel. Darcy v. Hardy, 203 F.2d 407, 427
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 865 (1953). In more recent years, however, members of the
D.C. Circuit have expressed some skepticism about the extent of a prosecutor's or a trial judge's
responsibility to ensure the adequacy of defense counsel's performance. See United States v.
Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 208-09 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J.); id. at 228 (MacKinnon, J.); see
also Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
80. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3120 (1987) ("we generally presume that
the lawyer is fully conscious of the overarching duty of complete loyalty to his or her client");
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347 ("trial courts necessarily rely in large measure upon the good
faith and good judgment of defense counsel"); but see Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. at 1699
("Nor is it amiss to observe that the willingness of an attorney to obtain such waivers [of the right
to individual counsel] from his clients may bear an inverse relationship to the care with which he
conveys all the necessary information to them.").
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example, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court noted that trial
judges may presume that defense lawyers act ethically.81 If this is true,
then why can't prosecutors indulge a similar presumption? Two com-
mentators, Margolin and Coliver, have suggested that by calling upon
the trial court to inquire into defense counsel's potential conflict of
interest, a prosecutor unfairly denies defense counsel the "presumption
of professional integrity to which lawyers are usually entitled. '"82
This argument is flawed, however, because as the Mannhalt case
shows, the presumption is not a conclusive one. Not every defense
attorney will recognize his ethical obligation or act accordingly when
faced with a potential conflict. 83 Particularly in a case where, after
receiving notice of a potential conflict, the defense attorney himself
fails to apprise the court of the problem, there is good reason to believe
that the attorney is not functioning consistently with the standard of
ethical practice usually expected of defense lawyers. 84 Therefore, not-
withstanding the presumption recognized by the Supreme Court in
Sullivan, disclosure to defense counsel alone does not sufficiently
guarantee that the defendant will receive conflict-free representation.
Finally, it may be argued that it is proper for a prosecutor to refrain
from initiating a judicial inquiry into defense counsel's potential conflict
of interest, because the subsequent inquiry may be unfair, or at least
appear to be unfair, to the defendant. As Margolin and Coliver point
out, a judicial inquiry into defense counsel's potential conflict may
damage the defendant's relationship with his attorney while affording
the prosecutor unfair access to confidential information and defense
strategy. 85
81. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
82. Margolin & Coliver, supra note 18, at 229-30.
83. See, e.g., Zuck v. State of Alabama, 588 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 833 (1979) (defense attorney knew of facts giving rise to conflict of interest but never
advised the defendant); Castillo v. Estelle, 504 F.2d 1243, 1244- 45 (5th Cir. 1974).
84. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 346 (defense counsel has an obligation "to advise
the court promptly when a conflict of interest arises during the course of trial"); Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 485-86 ("defense attorneys have the obligation, upon discovering a conflict
of interests, to advise the court at once of the problem").
85. Margolin & Coliver, supra note 18, at 229-30. This argument also finds support in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in which the Court made clear that the standard
of attorney competence which it set out was intended, in part, to discourage inquiries into the
quality of defense counsel's performance. The Court explained:
Counsel's performance and even willingness to serve could be adversely affected [by the
proliferation of hearings concerning the effectiveness of counsel]. Intensive scrutiny of
counsel ... could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel,
discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney
and client.
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The answer to this argument is that the fault, if any, lies not with
the prosecutor who makes disclosure but with the trial judge who con-
ducts the subsequent inquiry. By notifying the trial judge, the prose-
cutor does not compel the court to undertake an intrusive inquiry, but
simply allows the court to carry out its own responsibilities as it views
them. An inquiry sufficient to protect the defendant can be undertaken
without impugning defense counsel's competence and without requiring
the disclosure of otherwise confidential information. For example, the
procedure prescribed by the Second Circuit contemplates the appoint-
ment or retention of a second lawyer to advise the defendant about the
risks created by the potential conflict. 86 Although the trial judge must
subsequently inquire into the defendant's understanding of these risks
and the defendant's willingness to undertake them, this procedure does
not necessitate detailed public disclosure of defense strategy or defen-
dant confidences. If this procedure endangers the defendant's relation-
ship with his attorney at all, the danger pales in comparison to the risk
that the defendant will be denied adequate representation as a result of
an unexamined conflict.
On balance, then, the Ninth Circuit in Mannhalt has the better of
the argument. Each of the ethical obligations which require disclosure
to opposing counsel should also require disclosure to the court. First,
the duty to avoid the relitigation of criminal cases requires a prosecutor
to take the small step of alerting the court to defense counsel's potential
conflict. If the court had been alerted in the Mannhalt case, it would
have had the opportunity to conduct a hearing at which Mannhalt would
have been advised of the potential conflict and then given the choice
between securing another lawyer or waiving his right to counsel's
undivided loyalties. This would almost certainly have averted the suc-
Id. at 678-79. Undoubtedly, inquiries into counsel's competence which are conducted before or
during trial will pose an even greater threat to the attorney-client relationship than the type of post-
trial hearing which the Court sought to discourage in Washington. It has been argued that pretrial
inquiries into counsel's ability to provide conflict-free representation creates similar problems.
Such inquiries may undermine the relationship of trust between a defendant and his attorney, as
well as discourage other lawyers from representing similarly situated defendants in future cases.
At the same time, it has been said that by initiating a hearing at which counsel must defend his con-
duct, a prosecutor would unfairly compel the attorney to make factual disclosures of evidence to
which the prosecution might not otherwise be entitled. Margolin & Coliver, supra note 18, at
229-30, 254.
For a recent, extreme description of how prosecutors, as part of a pattern of prosecutorial
misconduct, wrongfully insinuated that defense attorneys had conflicts of interest, see United
States v. Shuck, 705 F. Supp. 1177 (N.D. W.Va 1989).
86. United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 888-90 (2d Cir. 1982); see United States v.
Unger, 700 F.2d 445, 453-54 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 276 (5th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1972).
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cession of post-trial proceedings which culminated in the reversal of
Mannhalt's conviction and the need for a new trial.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit's prescription is warranted by the pros-
ecutor's ethical obligation to give the accused a fair trial. This includes
an affirmative obligation to ensure that the defendant's constitutional
rights are protected. When a prosecutor sees that a defendant is being
denied the right to independent representation, the prosecutor has a duty
to take steps to correct the problem, whether or not it is of her own
making. This means that if the defense attorney has failed to withdraw
from the representation after being apprised of a potential conflict of
interest, the prosecutor has an ethical obligation to initiate judicial
inquiries in order to ensure that the defendant either waives the right to
conflict-free representation or obtains an attorney who has no conflict.87
C. The Choice of Full Disclosure
United States v. Iorizzo a8 illustrates that apprising the court of
defense counsel's potential conflict may not be sufficient in itself to
satisfy the prosecutor's ethical responsibility.
The defendant in lorizzo owned a company which distributed motor
fuel. Among other allegations, he faced mail fraud charges arising out
of his alleged attempt to evade state gasoline taxes by filing fraudulent
tax returns. The government's chief witness, James Tietz, was the cor-
porate employee who had prepared the tax returns. Several years
earlier, Tietz had testified before the State Tax Commission in connec-
tion with a related tax investigation. He had been represented at that
proceeding by Iorizzo's trial attorney.
The federal prosecutor recognized well in advance of trial that
defense counsel had a potential conflict of interest because of his prior
representation of Tietz. At a pretrial conference, the prosecutor raised
87. This ethical obligation has been expressly recognized on a number of occasions. For
example, in United States ex rel. Vriner v. Hedrick, 500 F. Supp. 977, 983 (C.D. Il. 1980), two
brothers were represented by a single attorney at a criminal trial in Illinois state court. The prose-
cutor did not call the potential conflict to the attention of either the defense attorney or the court.
Although both defense counsel and the court should have recognized the potential conflict on their
own, the District Court stated that "under the circumstances presented in this case, a prosecutor
should call to the attention of the court and opposing counsel the possibility of prejudicial conflict.
A prosecutor has an obligation to deal fairly and see that a defendant's constitutional rights are not
violated." Id. at 983. See also United States v. Holley, 826 F.2d 331, 333 (5th Cir. 1987); Peo-
ple v. Mattison, 67 N.Y.2d 462, 469 (1986); Lowenthal, supra note 28, at 36. But see Cerro v.
United States, 872 F.2d 780, 787 (7th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor has no constitutional duty to advise
the trial court that defense counsel has a potential conflict of interest).
88. 786 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1986).
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the problem with the district judge and suggested that "the Court is
forced to rule now whether [defense counsel] can continue representing
this client.' '89 Unimpressed with the problem, the trial judge said he
would not conduct an inquiry unless the government formally moved in
writing to disqualify the defense lawyer. The prosecution chose not to
do so and the trial went forward.
Since the government's case at trial hinged almost entirely on
Tietz's testimony, it was essential for defense counsel to discredit Tietz.
Toward that end, defense counsel sought to exploit the fact that, in his
earlier testimony before the State Tax Commission, Tietz had neither
implicated Iorizzo nor conceded that the tax returns were false. But on
cross-examination, when defense counsel began to refer to Tietz's
earlier testimony, the prosecutor objected, arguing that defense coun-
sel's conflict of interest made any such questioning improper. The trial
judge now realized that defense counsel had a conflict, but decided to
let the cross-examination proceed, reasoning that the defense attorney's"professional integrity" was his own concern, not the court's. The
judge warned defense counsel, however, that "if . . .an appropriate
[disciplinary] committee feels that what you are doing here is wrong,
then do not indicate that this Court condoned the cross-examinatioi."90
The next morning, upon further reflection, defense counsel decided
not to question Tietz about his prior testimony. At that point, 'the pros-
ecutor urged the court to establish on the record that Iorizzo was satis-
fied with defense counsel's representation even though counsel had a
conflict of interest. This time, the trial judge agreed on the need for an
inquiry, but instead of conducting it himself, he allowed defense coun-
sel briefly to question his client in open court.9'
On appeal from the conviction that followed, lorizzo argued that he
had been denied the assistance of counsel free from conflicts of interest.
The Court of Appeals agreed, finding that trial counsel's "decision to
forgo inquiry into Tietz's prior testimony was not the result of a tactical
judgment by a conflict-free lawyer that such evidence would not be
helpful to Iorizzo. . . . The decision to forgo inquiry was ...made
solely to protect the interests of defense counsel." ' 92 The appellate
court further found that Iorizzo had not effectively waived his right to
89. Id. at 54-55. The appellate court's opinion does not disclose defense counsel's reaction
to the prosecutor's argument.
90. Id. at 55.
91. Id. at 56-57.




conflict-free representation, because the trial judge had failed to follow
the specific procedures previously established by the Second Circuit.
The trial judge should have personally advised Iorizzo of the dangers
arising from defense counsel's conflict, given Iorizzo an adequate
opportunity to consider those dangers, and then elicited from Iorizzo in
his own words that he understood the dangers and freely accepted
them. 93
As a "final note," the court of appeals blamed the prosecutors for
the reversal of Iorizzo's conviction. In the court's view, it was not
good enough that the prosecutors had apprised the trial judge of defense
counsel's potential conflict in advance of trial. Chastising the prosecu-
tors for failing to take the further step of filing a pretrial disqualification
motion, the court stated:
The reversal here is the direct result of the prosecution's using
defense counsel's conflict of interest as a means of affecting
the evidence going before the jury instead of moving for his
disqualification before trial. The prosecutors here were aware
of defense counsel's conflict of interest at an early stage and
were invited by the district judge to make a disqualification
motion in writing. We trust that this decision will ensure that
a pretrial disposition of such issues will occur in the future. 94
At first glance, it is hard to understand the appellate court's deci-
sion to single out the prosecutors for blame. Both defense counsel and
the trial judge were equally aware of the potential conflict of interest
before trial began. The defense attorney had ample opportunity, in
accordance with well-established ethical rules, 95 either to secure
Iorizzo's knowing and voluntary consent or to withdraw from the repre-
sentation. Similarly, the trial judge had ample opportunity to conduct
an inquiry, in accordance with well-established procedures, 96 to ascer-
tain whether Iorizzo was willing to waive his right to an attorney with
undivided loyalties. One would expect under these circumstances that,
having disregarded courses of conduct which are clearly prescribed by
the law, the defense attorney and the court would bear equal, if not
greater, responsibility for bringing about the reversal of Iorizzo's
conviction.
Moreover, even assuming that the problem was largely of the pros-
ecution's making, it is unclear whether the Second Circuit has pre-
scribed the right solution. Although the Iorizzo court made it clear that
93. Id. at 59 (citing United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881, 888-90 (2d Cir. 1980)).
94. Id.
95. See supra note 36, and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 40, and accompanying text.
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the prosecutors should have filed a written disqualification motion, the
court did not make it clear why the prosecutors should have done so.
On the one hand, the court may have meant that the prosecutors had
some responsibility to press vigorously for defense counsel's disqualifi-
cation. On the other hand, the court may have meant that the prosecu-
tors should have filed a motion as a device for calling the trial judge's
attention to his responsibility to conduct a hearing at which the defen-
dant would have an opportunity to make a knowing and voluntary
waiver on the record.
If the court meant that the prosecutor should have sought disqualifi-
cation, even if Iorizzo was willing to make a knowing and voluntary
waiver, then its dicta was not well thought out. In this case, a dis-
qualification motion could easily have been perceived as a tactical
weapon intended by the prosecutor to unfairly deprive the defendant of
an effective advocate. Defense counsel had represented Iorizzo and
Iorizzo's employees for a number of years. Over time, the attorney
undoubtedly had developed a detailed knowledge of the workings of
Iorizzo's business which would be useful in defending Iorizzo on the
pending criminal charges. Moreover, a relationship of trust and con-
fidence most likely had developed between Iorizzo and his lawyer.
These facts would support a perception that the prosecutor's attempt to
disqualify defense counsel was wrongfully motivated, and the percep-
tion would be compounded by the fact that the trial judge, whose
obligation to ensure the defendant a fair trial is at least as great as that
of the prosecutor, saw no need to initiate a hearing when apprised of the
potential conflict.
If the disqualification motion were meant simply to be an attention-
getting device which would be withdrawn after the defendant made an
effective waiver of conflict-of-interest claims, it would still subject the
prosecutor to criticism, since it would be perceived by the public as an
attempt to deprive the defendant of his chosen counsel. 97 Nevertheless,
the court correctly recognized that when defense counsel has a potential
conflict, the prosecutor does not necessarily discharge his ethical
97. It is hard to see why the prosecutor in Jorizzo should have been required immediately to
file a formal motion, thereby placing himself in the position of appearing to act unfairly, unless,
as the Second Circuit read the trial record, the district judge was clearly unwilling to conduct an
inquiry in the absence of a formal motion. At least in the first instance, it should have been suffi-
cient for the prosecutor to call the trial judge's attention to United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881,
888-90 (2d Cir. 1982), which established the judge's duty, independent of a disqualification
motion, to initiate an inquiry into defense counsel's potential conflict.
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responsibility merely by making pretrial disclosure to defense coun-
sel and the court. In many cases, defense counsel does not with-
draw after he is apprised of the potential conflict and the trial judge
fails to initiate a hearing to determine whether the defendant will waive
conflict of interest claims. 98 In more unusual cases, such as Iorizzo, a
trial judge will refuse to conduct an adequate hearing in the absence of
a formal motion. 99 In cases such as these, the prosecutor must move to
disqualify counsel, if only as a device to encourage the trial judge to
resolve the problem in advance of trial. Otherwise, the defendant may
involuntarily and unknowingly be forced to go to trial with an attorney
whose loyalties are divided, and by the time the trial court or an appel-
late court recognizes the problem, a new trial may be required. A pros-
ecutor's ethical responsibilities both to the court and to the defendant
require him to take every available step to avert these possibilities, even
if that means exposing himself to undeserved criticism from the
defense.
D. The Choice of a Disqualification Motion
Wheat v. United States 00 illustrates the ethical perils of seeking
defense counsel's disqualification.
Wheat and others allegedly conspired to distribute thousands of
pounds of marijuana. While Wheat awaited trial, two of his co-
defendants received excellent representation from an attorney named
Iredale. 10" The first, Gomez-Barajas, obtained an acquittal on the nar-
cotics charges as well as an extremely lenient plea offer with respect to
other, unrelated charges. The second co-defendant, Bravo, was per-
mitted to plead guilty to less serious narcotics charges than the ones
contained in the indictment. Having been impressed by the quality of
Iredale's work, Wheat asked Iredale to defend him in place of, or in
addition to, his original trial lawyer.
98. See, e.g., Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833
(1979) (trial judge was aware of potential conflict but did not initiate an inquiry); United States
v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251, 1260 (5th Cir. 1978); Castillo v. Estelle, 504 F.2d 1243, 1244-45 (5th
Cir. 1974).
99. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. at 272-73.
100. 108 S. Ct. 1692 (1988).
101. Iredale has been recognized as one of the country's top criminal defense lawyers, and
has argued twice before the Supreme Court. See S. NAiFEH & G. SMrrn, THE Bsr LAwYERs iN
AMERICA 406 (1987). See United States v. Quinn, 106 S. Ct. 1623 (1986); United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
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Although Iredale agreed to defend Wheat, the prosecutor objected
on the ground that Iredale would have a conflict of interest. The prose-
cutor foresaw two possible conflicts. First, the prosecutor might call
Bravo as a witness against Wheat. Iredale's loyalty to Bravo might
impair Iredale's ability to conduct an effective cross-examination. Sec-
ond, Gomez-Barajas's plea might be rejected, he might go to trial, and
Wheat might be called as a witness against Gomez-Barajas. If all those
things occurred, Iredale might not be able to cross-examine Wheat
effectively.
Although all three defendants agreed to waive any claims arising
out of the potential conflicts of interest, the trial judge refused to allow
Iredale to enter the case on behalf of Wheat. The judge rejected
defense counsel's assertion that a conflict was extremely unlikely to
arise and that, in any event, a trial court should uphold a defendant's
waiver of conflict-of-interest claims. Following Wheat's conviction,
both the Ninth Circuit and a majority of the Supreme Court determined
that the trial judge had acted within his discretion in refusing to permit
the substitution of counsel. In an opinion for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that, upon finding a "serious potential for con-
flict," a trial judge has broad latitude to disqualify a defendant's chosen
attorney in order to ensure that the trial is conducted within the ethical
standards of the legal profession and that the trial appears fair to all who
observe it. 102
The prosecutor's opposition to defense attorney Iredale's represen-
tation was sharply criticized by Justice Marshall in a dissenting opinion.
While agreeing with the majority that "a trial court may ...reject a
defendant's counsel [when] a serious conflict may indeed destroy the
integrity of the trial process," ' 10 3 Justice Marshall concluded that in
Wheat's case the potential conflict was an insubstantial one which had
probably been manufactured by the prosecutor in order to avoid having
to face a skillful opponent. After pointing out that the testimony of
Wheat's co-defendant, Bravo, was virtually worthless to the govern-
ment, since Bravo was unable to implicate Wheat in the alleged con-
spiracy, and, indeed, had never even met or heard of Wheat before the
indictment, Justice Marshall noted:
The prosecutor's decision to use Bravo as a witness was an
1 lth-hour development. Throughout the course of plea negoti-
102. Wheat, 108 S. Ct. at 1699-1700.
103. Id. at 1700.
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ations with Bravo, the prosecutor never had suggested that
Bravo testify at petitioner's trial. At Bravo's guilty-plea pro-
ceedings, when Iredale notified the District Court of peti-
tioner's substitution motion, the prosecutor conceded that he
had made no plans to call Bravo as a witness. Only after the
prosecutor learned of the substitution motion and decided to
oppose it did he arrange for Bravo's testimony . . . Espe-
cially in light of the scarce value of Bravo's testimony, this
prosecutorial behavior very plausibly may be viewed as a
maneuver to prevent Iredale from representing petitioner at
trial. Iredale had proved to be a formidable adversary; he
previously had gained an acquittal for the alleged kingpin of
the marijuana distribution scheme .... The prosecutor's deci-
sion to call Bravo as a witness may well have stemmed from a
concern that Iredale would do an equally fantastic job at peti-
tioner's trial. As the Court notes, government maneuvering of
this kind is relevant to a trial court's decision as to whether to
accept a criminal defendant's chosen counsel. The significant
possibility that the prosecutor was engaging in such bad-faith
conduct provides yet another reason to dispute the Court's
resolution of the case. 104
Justice Marshall's observations point up the difficult ethical prob-
lem that confronts prosecutors in cases, such as Wheat, where a defen-
dant is willing to waive claims arising out of defense counsel's conflict
of interest. It is not clear under what circumstances a prosecutor may
appropriately seek defense counsel's disqualification in the face of the
defendant's proferred waiver. The majority in Wheat conceded Justice
Marshall's point that it would have been improper for the prosecutor
"to 'manufacture' a conflict in order to prevent [the] defendant from
having a particularly able defense counsel at his side." 10 5 Apparently,
104. Id. at 1703 n.3.
105. Id. at 1699. Most would undoubtedly agree that even where defense counsel's conflict
is real and substantial and not of the prosecutor's making, it would be improper for a prosecutor
to use a disqualification motion for the purpose of eliminating a capable adversary or for any other
purely tactical purpose, such as to delay the trial or to put the defendant to the expense of retaining
a new lawyer. See United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 13 (lst Cir. 1986) ("while the govern-
ment may have gained some tactical advantage by forcing [the defendant's attorneys] to appear as
government witnesses rather than as advocates for the defense, the government may not infringe
upon the right to counsel of choice for such an improper purpose"); cf. In re Taylor, 567 F.2d
1183, 1191 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Rook, 276 Or. 695, 556 P.2d 1351 (1976). The prosecutor
stands on different footing from civil practitioners in this respect. In civil cases disqualification
motions are often filed for purely tactical reasons, and although courts occasionally respond with
irritation, they usually do not question the ethical propriety of these motions, see, e.g., Cox v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 847 F.2d 725, 732 (1lth Cir. 1988), except where the motions are
entirely without foundation. See, e.g., Minerals Engineering Co. v. Wold, 575 F. Supp. 166 (D.
Colo. 1983).
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in the majority's view, the trial judge could properly have found that
the prosecutor had a legitimate motivation for opposing Iredale's
appearance in the case. The majority opinion, however, did not say
what that legitimate motivation might have been. The majority's
silence on this score suggests that it, too, had some doubt about the
prosecutor's motives, but that, unlike the dissent, it was willing to give
the prosecutor the benefit of the doubt, in accordance with a presump-
tion that prosecutors generally act ethically.10 6
The Wheat decision leaves open two important questions concern-
ing the prosecutorial use of disqualification motions. The first question
is primarily procedural: Do prosecutors have a responsibility not simply
to avoid manufacturing conflicts of interest, but also to cooperate
affirmatively to reduce the need to disqualify defense counsel when a
conflict of interest was not improperly manufactured? The second
question is more substantive: What reasons are legitimate for seeking
defense counsel's disqualification notwithstanding the defendant's pro-
ferred waiver of conflict-of-interest claims? By its silence, the Court
leaves it to prosecutors, at least in the first instance, to answer these
questions for themselves.
1Hr. PROPOSED GUIDELINES GOVERNING DISQUALIFICATION MOTIONS
A. The Need for Published Guidelines
The judicial decisions concerning conflicts of interest adequately
describe the initial steps that a prosecutor must take upon learning of
defense counsel's potential conflict of interest. In general, the prose-
cutor must ensure that the defendant either secures independent counsel
or waives his right to independent counsel after a judicial inquiry on the
record. The prosecutor's responsibility to initiate judicial proceedings
prior to trial is implicit in both the prosecutor's duty to promote the
106. This was not the first time that a federal prosecutor has been given the benefit of the
ethical doubt. Like defense attorneys, prosecutors are generally presumed to act ethically. See,
e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. 1187, 1193-94 (1987) (plurality oninion of Powell,
J.); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37 (1965) ("Because of this confidence in the integrity
of the federal prosecutor, [Fed.R.Crim.P.] 23(e) does not require that the Government articulate
its reasons for demanding a jury trial at the time it refuses to consent to a defendant's proferred
waiver. Nor should we assume that federal prosecutors would demand a jury trial for an ignoble
purpose."). This presumption is not irrebuttable, however, and criminal defendants may be
entitled to relief in cases where they can demonstrate that the prosecutor has acted out of improper
motivations. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711 (1969); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356




fairness of criminal proceedings and the prosecutor's duty to promote
the efficiency of criminal justice. Unless defense counsel's potential
conflict is recognized and waived by the defendant in advance of trial,
the defendant may be entitled to assert either during or after trial that
his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free representation was abridged
and thereby obtain a new trial.
The courts have not provided adequate guidance, however, with
respect to the steps that a prosecutor should take when the defendant is
willing to waive conflict of interest claims and proceed to trial with an
attorney who may have a conflict of interest. In many cases, prosecu-
tors have moved to disqualify opposing counsel based on a professed
concern for the interests of the defendant or the legal system. Like the
Supreme Court in Wheat, the lower federal courts have not addressed
whether, before seeking to override a defendant's waiver, a prosecutor
has a duty to cooperate to eliminate defense counsel's potential conflict
of interest. Nor have courts addressed the propriety of seeking defense
counsel's disqualification when the defendant is willing to waive con-
flict of interest claims.
One might be skeptical whether in most cases prosecutors are
actually acting out of proper motives when they ask the trial court to
override a defendant's proferred waiver. 107 Cause to suspect a prose-
cutor's motives inevitably arises out of the prosecutor's adversarial
role. Whereas a decision by a trial judge sua sponte to disqualify
defense counsel might be accepted as fair because of the perception that
the trial judge is neutral and detached, a prosecutor's decision to file a
disqualification motion in precisely the same case could easily be
viewed as unfair simply because the government may stand to gain from
the hearing on the motion or from disqualification itself. An additional
cause for skepticism is that few if any prosecutor's offices have pub-
lished guidelines governing when to make a disqualification motion.
The virtually unfettered discretion given to prosecutors, combined with
the absence of any extended discussion of the problem by the lawyers'
codes and judicial opinions, contributes to the perception that motions
to disqualify are being filed for the wrong reasons.
107. Cf. Wolfram, supra note 16, at 318 n.21 ("The motives of a prosecutor seeking, appar-
ently altruistically, to obtain separate representation for grand jury targets, might be explicable on
much less elegant grounds as an attempt to break apart a solid front in order to play one witness
off against another."); Margolin & Coliver, supra note 18, at 229 ("It is the authors' opinion,
based on familiarity with more than a dozen cases in which such disqualification inquiries have
been filed, that the government's primary motive in bringing such motions is to disqualify the most
competent lawyers and firms, with little regard for their reputation for ethical practice."); Lowen-
thai, supra note 28, at 55 ("There are reasons to believe that some motions to disqualify counsel
in criminal cases are also filed for tactical advantage. ... ).
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In light of the prosecutor's duty not just to act fairly but also to pro-
mote the appearance that criminal proceedings are fair, prosecutors'
offices have a responsibility to minimize the impression that disqualifi-
cation motions are being filed for improper reasons. The obvious way
for prosecutors' offices to do that would be for them to issue guidelines
which govern the filing of disqualification motions.10 8 Such guidelines
should address both the procedural question and the substantive ques-
tion left unanswered by Wheat.
B. The Prosecutor's Duty to Cooperate in Eliminating Conflicts
As both the majority opinion in Wheat and Justice Marshall's
dissenting opinion recognized, a prosecutor often has an opportunity to"manufacture" conflicts of interest which could form the basis for dis-
qualifying defense counsel. For example, the prosecutor might call
defense counsel's former client as a witness, not because the witness's
testimony is particularly useful, but out of a motivation to create a con-
flict between counsel's duty to conduct a vigorous cross-examination
and his duty to preserve the former client's confidences. Or, the prose-
cutor might initiate a criminal investigation of defense counsel, not
because she believes that there are genuine questions concerning the
lawfulness of the attorney's conduct, but out of a motivation to create
a conflict between the defense attorney's duty to his client and his per-
sonal interest. It is unquestionably improper to call witnesses or to
initiate investigations for these purposes.
A more difficult question is presented when, even though the
potential conflict was not deliberately created by the prosecutor, it is
within the prosecutor's power to reduce the need to disqualify defense
108. See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, § 3-2.5(a) (1979)
("Each prosecutor's office should develop a statement of (i) general policies to guide the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion and (ii) procedures of the office."); see also Abrams, Internal Policy:
Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1971); Beck, The Admin-
istrative Law of Criminal Procedure: The Development of Prosecutorial Policy, 27 AM. U.L.
REv. 310, 374-76 (1978); Cox, Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview, 13 AM. CiuM. L. REv,
383, 401 (1976); Vorenberg, Decent Restraint on Prosecutorial Discretion, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1521,1562 (1981); white, A Proposal for the Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 191 U. PA.
L. REV. 439, 457-58 (1971); cf UNrTED STATES ATroRNEYS' MANUAL, § 9-2.161(a) (internal
guidelines governing the issuance of a subpoena to attorneys for information relating to their
clients).
In the context of fourth amendment challenges to government searches, courts have
recognized on numerous occasions that the implementation of internal guidelines which constrain
the government's exercise of discretion may justify otherwise illegal conduct. See, e.g., Illinois
v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (upholding search of arrested person's belongings which was




counsel. Under such circumstances, does a prosecutor have an obliga-
tion to take steps to reduce or eliminate the need to disqualify defense
counsel? It would be reasonable for prosecutors to assume an ethical
obligation to take such steps insofar as it is possible to do so without
imperiling legitimate government interests. The duty to "give those
accused of crime a fair trial"10 9 should encompass a duty to accomodate
a defendant's constitutionally recognized interest in counsel of choice,
at least where no independent government interests would be com-
promised in the process.
In some cases a prosecutor can reduce the need for disqualification
simply by making pretrial disclosure of information that would not
ordinarily be disclosed until the trial began. For example, suppose that
the prosecutor advises defense counsel and the trial judge that she plans
to call defense counsel's former client as a witness. The court in turn
initiates an inquiry to determine whether to disqualify defense counsel
either because of the magnitude of the potential conflict or because the
defendant will not waive the potential conflict. As the majority recog-
nized in Wheat, it is difficult for a judge in this pre-trial context to
evaluate the nature and dimensions of the potential conflict. 110 A con-
servative trial judge might be disposed to disqualify the defense attorney
in the absence of information that demonstrates that the potential con-
flict is not a serious one.
In such a case, the prosecutor ordinarily ought to turn over any
information she possesses that would weigh in favor of upholding the
defendant's choice of counsel. For example, if the government's prof-
fer demonstrates that the witness willtestify concerning matters that are
essentially undisputed, there may be'ino need for defense counsel to
impeach the witness at all, much less to employ confidential communi-
cations. Alternatively, if the witness's prior statements to the govern-
ment contain the same information that the witness previously provided
in confidence to defense counsel, there will be little danger that the
defense attorney will inadvertently exploit the previously confidential
disclosures. Ordinarily, the prosecutor would have no duty before trial
to disclose the witness's prospective testimony or to provide the wit-
ness's prior statements. 1 Yet, in the absence of a compelling justifi-
cation-such as a legitimate concern that the defendant will suborn
109. Donnelly v. DeChristofo, 416 U.S. 637, 649 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
110. 108 S. Ct. at 1699.
111. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b); United States v. White, 750 F.2d 726, 728 (8th Cir.
1984) (defendant is not entitled to pretrial disclosure of the government's witness list); United
States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 1975) (defendant is not entitled to pretrial dis-
closure of statements of government witnesses).
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perjury-a prosecutor ought to reveal that information to the trial judge
and defense counsel when it tends to show that disqualification is
unnecessary.
In other cases, a prosecutor may be able to enter into stipulations
in order to reduce the need for disqualification. Suppose, for example,
that the prosecutor intends to call either the defense counsel's former
client or the defense attorney himself as a witness, but that the defen-
dant is willing to stipulate to the content of the witness's testimony in
order to eliminate any potential conflict. Ordinarily, a prosecutor has
no duty to enter into stipulations as a substitute for live testimony. 112
But when a stipulation would not materially affect the government's
case, a prosecutor ought to agree to it if it will allow the defendant to
retain his chosen counsel. 113
C. Justifications for Disqualification Motions
A prosecutor should seek defense counsel's disqualification only
when the government has a compelling reason for overriding the defen-
dant's choice of counsel. Moreover, in making a disqualification
motion, a prosecutor should state precisely what interests she seeks to
promote. By doing so, a prosecutor would minimize the public percep-
tion that her disqualification motion is a purely tactical device designed
to obtain an unfair advantage over the defendant.
At least five plausible reasons might be advanced in criminal cases
to explain a prosecutor's pretrial motion to disqualify opposing counsel
notwithstanding the defendant's purported willingness to waive any
conflict-of-interest claims.114 It might be argued that the disqualifica-
tion will serve: (1) to protect the government's case at trial from iden-
tifiable harm; (2) to advance a related investigation; (3) to promote the
appearance that the trial was conducted fairly and in accordance with
prevailing ethical norms; (4) to protect against the later reversal of a
criminal conviction; or (5) to preserve appellate resources which might
112. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 774 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Gilman, 684 F.2d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Peltier, 585 F.2d 314, 324-25 (8th
Cir. 1978); Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86, 88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 824 (1958).
113. Cf. United States v. Spletzer, 535 F.2d 950, 955 (5th Cir. 1976) (government improp-
erly introduced defendant's judgment of conviction, where the defendant offered to stipulate to a
prior conviction and there was therefore no need for the evidence).
114. Other justifications might be advanced when a disqualification motion is made in the
investigative stage of a criminal proceeding, see generally Tague, supra note 25, at 316-29, or
when a disqualification motion is made before sentencing. Cf. In re Abrams, 56 N.J. 271, 275-76,
266 A.2d 275, 278 (1970) (defense counsel's receipt of a fee from the defendant's employer may
discourage him from advising the defendant that if he cooperates with the prosecution's investiga-
tion of the employer he may obtain a more lenient sentence).
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have to be expended in response to a claimed denial of the right to
counsel. It is questionable, however, whether these reasons are all suf-
ficiently compelling to justify an attempt to override the defendant's
choice of counsel.
1. Protecting against harm to the prosecution's case-The prose-
cutor would be justified in seeking defense counsel's disqualification in
order to prevent identifiable prejudice to the prosecution which might
result at trial from the defense attorney's conflict. For example, in a
case such as Mannhalt, in which the attorney must choose between
being a witness or being an advocate, the defendant is not the only party
whose concrete interests are at stake. There is a risk in such a case that
the jury will discover that defense counsel has personal knowledge of
relevant facts, such as facts which might be used to impeach a govern-
ment witness. The government could be prejudiced if, perceiving
defense counsel to be an unsworn witness, the jury chose to place undue
weight on defense counsel's arguments.1 15  In most cases, it would be
unreasonable for the government to accept on faith that defense counsel
will be careful not to suggest to the jury that he has personal knowledge
of relevant facts. If there is no other reasonable way to protect the
government from this type of prejudice, then the government would be
justified in opposing defense counsel. 116
Similarly, in a case in which the government anticipated that it
would call defense counsel as a witness at the defendant's trial, the
prosecutor might be justified in seeking counsel's disqualification.
However, the motion would only be justified if the government had a
genuine need for the attorney's testimony and there was a substantial
likelihood that the attorney would in fact be called as a witness. Other-
wise, the purported need for the attorney's testimony would justifiably
be perceived as a pretext for eliminating an unwanted adversary.1 1 7
115. See, e.g., United States v. Kwang Fu Peng, 766 F.2d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 1985); United
States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d at 1074-75 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Cortellesso, 663 F.2d
361, 363 (1st Cir. 1981).
116. The government would also have an interest in avoiding identifiable prejudice in a case
such as United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1979), in which defense counsel, in the
course of his former employment as a federal prosecutor, had obtained nonpublic information rele-
vant to the defense of his client. See also United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198 (3d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Walsh, 699 F. Supp. 469 (D.N.J. 1988); but see United States v. Washington,
797 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1986) (district court improperly disqualified defense attorneys, who were
former government lawyers, without a hearing with respect to their assertion that they never
received confidential information regarding the case).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 857 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1988); see generally Pierce
& Colamarino, Defense Counsel as a Witness for the Prosecution: Curbing the Practice of Issuing
Grand Jury Subpoenas to Counsel for Targets of Investigations, 36 HASTmNGS L.J. 821 (1985);
Zwerling, Federal Grand Juries v. Attorney Independence and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 1263 (1976).
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In most instances, however, the government will not suffer because
of defense counsel's conflict of interest. For example, in cases such as
Iorizzo and Wheat, in which defense counsel would be called on to
cross-examine a past or present client, the government's case would not
be harmed and, indeed, might benefit from defense counsel's possible
inability to conduct a vigorous cross-examination. Similarly, in the
common situation in which a single defense attorney represents jointly
charged defendants, the government has no legitimate interest that is
threatened by defense counsel's potential conflict; to the contrary, the
government will be the likely beneficiary of any conflict of interest that
emerges. Only on rare occasions will a prosecutor be able to point to
any way in which the government's case at trial might be prejudiced by
defense counsel's potential conflict of interest.
2. Advancing a related criminal investigation-The prosecutor
might also seek to disqualify a defense attorney whose conflict of inter-
est would tend to cause him to advise the defendant in a manner which
would be adverse to the government's investigatory interest. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Kerlegon,118 the defendant, a commissioner of
the Lake Charles Dock Board, was charged with extorting money from
the head of a stevedoring company. In exchange, Kerlegon allegedly
voted to award the company substantial business with the Port of Lake
Charles. His attorney, Carter, was under investigation for receiving
extortionate payments in connection with the same dock board vote. In
urging Carter's disqualification, the prosecutor argued, in part, that
Carter's interest in avoiding criminal charges would conflict with his
duty to give his client competent advice about whether to plea bargain
with the government. Specifically, Carter's personal interest might
lead him to discourage the defendant from pleading guilty and
cooperating with the government, since the defendant's cooperation
might require him to testify against Carter. It is reasonable to assume
that, in premising its disqualification motion on this potential conflict,
the prosecutor was concerned about the government's interests no less
than those of the defendant. 119
118. 690 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. La. 1988).
119. The government's investigative interest is implicated most often in organized crime and
narcotics cases in which defense counsel for a low-evel member of a criminal enterprise is paid
by a high-level member and is, in effect, "house counsel" to the enterprise. Under such circum-
stances, the attorney's financial stake in continuing to obtain referrals from members of the crimi-
nal enterprise would lead him to discourage his client from cooperating with the authorities. See,
e.g., United States v. Padilla-Martinez, 762 F.2d 942, 946-49 (1lth Cir. 1985); A. DERsnowrz,
THE BEsr DEFEasE 398-400 (1982).
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The government's investigatory interest has often been urged as a
basis for seeking the disqualification of a defense lawyer who represents
several targets of a grand jury investigation. 120 Courts have acknowl-
edged the legitimacy of the government's investigatory interest and
have recognized that, in such cases, a defense attorney has a conflict
which may discourage him from advising any one client to cooperate
with the government against the other clients. Some courts have held
that, in order to protect "the right of the public to an effective function-
ing grand jury," defense counsel should be disqualified. 121 Other
courts, such as New York's highest court in Matter of Robert
Abrams, 122 have held that disqualification of defense counsel is inap-
propriate, reasoning that the prosecutor's interest could be served in
other ways, such as by compelling individuals to testify in the grand
jury under a grant of immunity from prosecution.123
For a variety of reasons, a trial court would probably be even less
sympathetic to the government's investigative concerns in the post-
indictment, pre-trial stage of a criminal prosecution. First, the defen-
dant's interest in counsel of choice is greater after indictment than
during a grand jury investigation.12 4 Second, the defendant's decision
not to cooperate does not significantly impair the government's investi-
gation, since the prosecution may obtain the witness's testimony after
the trial. Finally, the government's investigative interest is not impli-
cated as clearly by a criminal prosecution as by a grand jury proceed-
ing. For these reasons and others, a trial court would probably con-
clude that, unlike the institutional interests of the judiciary, the prosecu-
tion's investigative interests are not sufficiently important to outweigh
the presumption in favor of the defendant's choice of counsel. Never-
theless, the legitimacy of the prosecution's investigative interests are
sufficiently well established to justify a disqualification motion in a case
in which those interests are at risk.
120. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Investigation Before the
February 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1977); In re Investigation Before
the April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Matter of Investigative Grand Jury
Proceedings on April 10, 1979, 480 F. Supp. 162 (N.D. Ohio 1979), app. dismissed, 621 F.2d
813 (6th Cir. 1980); Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings, 428 F. Supp. 273 (E.D. Mich. 1976); see
generally Epstein et al., Conflicts of Interest: A Trial Lawyer's Guide 187-200 (1984).
121. Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings, 428 F. Supp. 273, 278 (E.D. Mich. 1976); see also
Matter of Investigative Grand Jury Proceedings on April 10, 1979, 480 F. Supp.162 (N.D. Ohio
1979), app. dismissed, 621 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1980).
122. 62 N.Y.2d 183, 476 N.Y.S.2d 494, 465 N.E.2d 1 (1984).
123. Id. at 198-99.
124. Cf. Patterson v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2395-96 n.6 (1988) (a lawyer's functions at
trial are much more varied than they are during a police interrogation of the defendant).
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3. Preserving the appearance that the trial is fair and that ethical
standards are met-A third possible justification for a disqualification
motion would be to preserve the appearance that the defendant's convic-
tion was the product of a trial that was conducted fairly and ethically.
Like the trial court, 125 the prosecution has an institutional interest in
ensuring not only that a criminal trial is actually fair but also that it
appears to be fair. 126 That this interest may justify an attempt to over-
ride a defendant's choice of procedural options has been recognized in
a variety of contexts. For example, in United States v. Moon127 the
Second Circuit agreed that the prosecutor properly had refused to con-
sent to defendant Sun Myung Moon's waiver of a jury trial in light of
her view "that there was an overriding public interest in the appearance
as well as the fact of a fair trial, which could be achieved only by a
jury. "128 A prosecutor has a similar interest in ensuring that the con-
duct of a trial conforms with prevailing norms of professional ethics. 1 29
It may be questioned, however, whether moving to disqualify
defense counsel generally promotes the appearance that trials are con-
ducted fairly and ethically. In many cases, the public is likely to
perceive a conflict of interest as simply a technical problem, rather than
one that seriously undermines the fairness of a criminal proceeding. At
the same time, a prosecutor's disqualification motion may add to public
suspicion of the prosecutor and, if the motion is granted, of the court as
well. 130 As noted earlier, it is beyond dispute that a disqualification
motion may serve improper, as well as proper, purposes. 131 In oppos-
ing such motions, defense attorneys typically ascribe improper motives
125. See Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. at 1697 ("Federal courts have an independent
interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession
and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.").
126. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d at 1072 n.7 ("We believe the govern-
ment has a sufficient interest in preserving the integrity of a criminal proceeding in which one of
its potential witnesses is a former client of the defendant's counsel to allow the government to raise
the question [whether defense counsel should be disqualified].").
127. 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984).
128. Id. at 1217-18.
129. Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROFEsSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 1- 103(A) ("A lawyer possess-
ing unprivileged knowledge of a [disciplinary] violation ... shall report such knowledge" to the
court); id., DR 7-102(B)(2) ("A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that ... [a]
person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal shall promptly reveal the fraud
to the tribunal.").
130. Cf. United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1986); Woods v. Cov-
ington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976); Trinity Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. G&L
Ambulance Serv., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1280, 1282 (D. Conn. 1984) ("Disqualification of attorneys
during the course of litigation may... exacerbate the existing perception that judicial procedures
are . . . overly dependent on technicalities.").
131. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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to the prosecutor. A defense attorney's complaint that the prosecutor is
merely attempting to eliminate a capable adversary has the virtue of
impugning the prosecutor's motives while, at the same time, promoting
a positive perception of the defense attorney. A prosecutor cannot
easily dispel the resulting suspicion that her motion is in fact purely pre-
textual, particularly in view of the popular perception of the adversary
process, in which it would be anomalous for one party to assert the
opposing party's interests.
When disqualification motions are designed to promote a positive
public perception of the criminal proceeding, they should therefore be
limited to those cases where the motions themselves are likely to do
more good than harm. A disqualification motion might be justified, for
example, when "both the likelihood and the dimensions of the feared
conflict are substantial, "132 so that, if he were to continue in the
representation, defense counsel would probably become engaged in sig-
nificant ethical misconduct which would adversely affect the quality of
defense counsel's representation. 133 United States v. Iorizzo is a good
example of a case in which a disqualification motion would have been
appropriate. 1 Iorizzo's lawyer had previously represented the most
important government witness during an administrative proceeding in
which the witness gave testimony that was inconsistent with his trial tes-
timony. It was important for the defense to explore the prior testimony
on cross-examination of the witness, but, because of the prior repre-
sentation, it would be impossible for the defense lawyer to conduct such
an inquiry. Even if the defendant were to waive the ensuing conflict of
interest, the defense lawyer's inability to conduct an effective cross-
examination of the key government witness might have raised questions
about the fairness of a judgment of conviction.
On the other hand, a disqualification motion would not promote a
positive public perception of the criminal justice system in a case in
which the defendant is willing to waive conflict of interest claims and
the potential conflict is either remote or insubstantial. For example, in
United States v. Friedman,135 defense counsel's law firm had previously
represented a government witness at a hearing before the SEC. Never-
theless, defense counsel's potential conflict of interest was both remote
and insubstantial. The defense attorney's law firm had represented the
witness only in its capacity as corporate counsel to the witness's com-
132. Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. at 1700-01 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d at 1073, 1074.
134. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
135. 854 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989). See infra note 137.
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pany, and Friedman's lawyer had never himself conferred privately
with or provided personal legal advice to the government witness.
Thus, the defense attorney possessed no confidences that would have to
be preserved, at the possible expense of a vigorous cross-examination.
Moreover, the defense had no interest in cross-examining the witness
concerning his prior SEC testimony, because the defense recognized
that such cross-examination would open the door to potentially
devastating redirect examination by the government. The defendant, a
lawyer who was a former state prosecutor, adamently insisted on being
allowed to waive any conflict-of-interest claims relating to the prior
representation.1 36 An attempt by the prosecution to overcome that
waiver could reasonably have been viewed by the public not as an effort
to preserve the fairness of the trial, but as an effort to gain an unfair
advantage based on a gossamer possibility of conflict.
4. Protecting against a reversal of the conviction-A prosecutor
clearly would be justified in seeking defense counsel's disqualification
if there were good cause to fear that the defendant's purported waiver
could later be held to be invalid because it was not "knowing and vol-
untary.1 ' 37 This does not mean, however, that a disqualification
motion will always be justified by the prosecutor's interest in preserving
a judgment of conviction.
Courts have tended to overstate the risk of reversal following a pur-
ported waiver of conflict-of-counsel claims. For example, in United
States v. Sanders,1 38 a case decided shortly after Wheat, the district
judge opined that "it is not altogether clear that the execution of a
knowing and intelligent waiver of a potential conflict forecloses the
possibility that an actual conflict would adversely have affected the ade-
quacy of representation and violated Sanders' Sixth Amendment right to
counsel." ' 139 The present case law does not justify the courts' pro-
fessed concern. Appellate courts have held a defendant's waiver of
conflict-of-interest claims to be ineffective only in cases where the trial
judge failed properly to advise the defendant or adequately to question
136. 854 F.2d at 572-74.
137. See United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 572 (2d Cir. 1988) (the government
moved to disqualify defense counsel because it "realiz[ed] that any conviction it might obtain
against Friedman would be at risk" due to defense counsel's conflict of interest).
138. 690 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. IM. 1988).
139. 690 F. Supp. at 679; see also Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1698 (1988)
("[W]e note, without passing judgment on, the apparent willingness of Courts of Appeals to enter-





the defendant to ensure that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. 140
On the other hand, when the trial judge fully questioned the defendant
and subsequently determined that the defendant's waiver was knowing
and voluntary, courts have invariably rejected claims that defense
counsel failed to provide adequate assistance on account of a conflict of
interest.141 There is thus little realistic possibility of reversal due to
errors attributable to defense counsel's conflict as long as the waiver
proceedings are conducted carefully. 142
140. See, e.g., United States v. Iorizzo, 786 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v.
Unger, 700 F.2d 445, 451-54 (8th Cir. 1983); Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); United States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251, 1260 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Gaines, 529 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1976).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382, 1387-89 (7th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Beniach, 825 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1085
(5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Akinseye, 802 F.2d 740, 745 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Krebs, 788 F.2d 1166, 1173 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Noble, 754 F.2d 1324, 1334-35 (7th
Cir. 1985); United States v. Bradshaw, 719 F.2d 907, 911 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Waldman, 579 F.2d 649, 652-53 (1st Cir. 1978); see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 483
n.5 (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942)).
142. Several courts have suggested that if the defendant's waiver of potential conflicts is not
sufficiently broad, then the defendant's waiver may not foreclose all subsequent claims based on
errors attributable to an actual conflict that emerged at trial. However, this concern may easily be
addressed by requiring the defendant to make a broad waiver of all claims relating to defense
counsel's potential or actual conflict.
For example, in United States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 835 (Ist Cir. 1985), a panel of the
First Circuit suggested that the waiver of potential conflicts of interest may not be tantamount to
a waiver of actual conflicts of interest. Thus, the court suggested that, notwithstanding a pretrial
waiver, a defendant may be entitled to a new trial if he can show that his trial attorney had an
actual conflict which impaired his representation. The court's suggestion is highly questionable,
since a waiver of potential conflicts would ordinarily be viewed as a waiver of all sixth amendment
claims based on defense counsel's conflict of interest. See supra note 32. But even if a court were
to construe waivers narrowly, the disqualification of counsel would not be necessary, since an
express waiver of all conflict-of-interest claims could be demanded instead.
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Tonaldi v. Elrod, 716 F.2d 431, 436-37 (7th Cir. 1973),
a panel of the Seventh Circuit suggested that a defendant who waived his right to conflict-free
representation might later claim that his "attorney acted incompetently in deciding jointly to repre-
sent [him] and his co-defendants." Thus, a defendant may claim that he was denied his right to
receive competent advice concerning whether to seek independent counsel. Even assuming, how-
ever, that the conventional waiver is not broad enough to foreclose this claim, this claim can still
be averted by measures short of disqualification. For example, the court might require the defen-
dant to consult with independent counsel before deciding whether to waive his sixth amendment
right. Moreover, the court might require the defendant explicitly to waive any ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims based upon the trial lawyer's advice and decision regarding the joint rep-
resentation.
There is no reason why the broader waivers would be inadequate. In a related context, it
is well recognized that a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel and decision to represent him-
self forecloses later claims that he was denied effective representation. See, e.g., Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 n.46 (1975) ("A defendant who elects to represent himself can-
not thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of effective
assistance of counsel."); United States v. Roggio, 863 F.2d 41, 43 (1lth Cir. 1989); Hance v.
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A motion to disqualify counsel in order to preserve a criminal con-
viction is only justified when there is a genuine risk, and not just a
theoretical risk, of reversal. A genuine risk may exist, for example,
where, the defendant was not competent to understand the complexities
of defense counsel's conflict and the risks it posed, 143 or where, at the
time he sought to make his waiver, the defendant was not in an ade-
quate position to anticipate all the conflicts that might later arise. 144 In
the run-of-the-mill case, however, a disqualification motion would not
be justified simply as a means of protecting against a later reversal of
the defendant's conviction.
5. Avoiding the expenditure of appellate resources-Finally, a
prosecutor might seek defense counsel's disqualification in order to
avoid the later expenditure of resources on post-trial litigation in which
the defendant challenges the adequacy of trial counsel. This purported
interest is not entirely insubstantial, 145 since a defendant's waiver of
conflict-of-interest claims at trial will not necessarily relieve the prose-
cution of the burden of demonstrating on appeal that the waiver was
valid.146 It is doubtful whether the interest in preserving government
Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 950 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983); United States v. Rowe,
565 F.2d 635, 637 (10th Cir. 1977). It makes sense that waivers of the right to conflict-free rep-
resentation should similarly be interpreted to waive all claims of attorney incompetence attributable
to conflicts of interest.
143. See United States v. Quinones, 613 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); United States
v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978); cf United States v. Donahue, 560 F.2d 1039, 1042 (1st
Cir. 1977).
144. See United States v. Padilla-Martinez, 762 F.2d 942, 946-49 (11th Cir. 1985) (trial
judge was not provided sufficient information to enable him to explain the potential conflict to the
defendants); United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Calabria, 614
F. Supp. 187 (E.D. Pa. 1985); United States v. Dickson, 508 F. Supp. 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
United States v. Helton, 471 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); cf United States v. Akinseye, 802
F.2d 740, 745-46 7 n.3 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 976 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834 (1982); United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir. 1978)
("If the conflict of interest problem which [the defendant] raises on appeal had been a completely
unknown contingency prior to his trial, we might be reluctant to find waiver of his right to counsel
free from conflict of interest.").
145. Cf. United States v. Jones, 623 F. Supp. 110, 114 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("A criminal defen-
dant's right to be represented by the counsel of his choice must be balanced against the public's
interest in a fair criminal proceeding, free from future attacks.").
146. One prominent illustration of this is the recent case of Stanley Friedman, a former New
York City official who was convicted of racketeering and other charges arising out of his role in
a bribery scheme. United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1637 (1989). Citing the Second Circuit's decision in Iorizzo, the government filed a pretrial
motion to disqualify Friedman's well-known trial attorney, Thomas Puccio, who had previously
represented one of the government's prospective trial witnesses. In response, Friedman agreed to
waive any purported conflict and, at the same time, questioned the prosecution's good faith in fil-
ing the motion. Friedman told the press that the motion was nothing more than "another out-
rageous media ploy to deprive me of a fair trial," N.Y. Times, May 9, 1986, at p. B-3, while his
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resources alone is sufficiently compelling to justify an effort to override
the defendant's choice of counsel in a case where there is little reason
to doubt that the defendant's waiver will ultimately be found to be
valid. Most defendants will challenge a criminal conviction without
much regard for their likelihood of success.147 Challenges to the ade-
quacy of counsel, in one form or another, are among the claims that are
advanced most frequently by convicted defendants, and responding to
such claims, particularly where there was a waiver at trial, does not
require a great expenditure of resources. Certainly, a response to a
conflict of interest claim requires no greater effort than a response to
the alternative claim that would be raised if defense counsel were dis-
qualified, namely, that the trial court abused its discretion in overriding
the defendant's waiver.148 For these reasons, it is hard to justify
attempting to deprive a defendant of his choice of counsel merely for
the convenience of avoiding an unmeritorious claim on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Recent decisions have recognized that when a prosecutor learns of
defense counsel's potential conflict of interest, she has an affirmative
obligation to act before trial to ensure that the defendant's interests will
not be impaired without the defendant's voluntary, informed consent.
This obligation involves, as a first step, advising defense counsel of the
potential conflict. If defense counsel does not withdraw from the repre-
sentation and does not initiate a hearing to place the defendant's waiver
on the record, then the prosecutor should advise the trial court of the
potential conflict and ask the court to inquire into the defendant's will-
ingness to waive potential conflicts. If the court is unwilling to under-
take such an inquiry in the absence of a formal disqualification motion,
trial attorney suggested to the court that the motion was merely an attempt to delay the trial. 854
F.2d at 572.
Acceding to the defendant's desire to continue with Puccio's representation, the district
court denied the government's motion. But this did not discourage Friedman from retaining a new
lawyer following his conviction and arguing strenuously on appeal that he had been deprived of
conflict-free representation because of Puccio's former representation of the government witness.
The Second Circuit ultimately "conclude[d] without difficulty" that Friedman had knowingly and
voluntarily waived this claim, id. at 574, but not before both the government and the appellate
court were compelled to address the issue at considerable length.
147. Defense counsel may file an appeal without regard to the likelihood of success except in
those rare cases in which the appeal would be "wholly frivolous," that is, "lack[ing] any basis in
law or fact." McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin District 1, 108 S. Ct. 1895, 1902 & n.10
(1988); accord United States v. Anders, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
148. Cf. 108 S. Ct. at 1698 ("trial courts confronted with multiple representations face the
prospect of being 'whip-sawed' by assertions of error no matter which way they rule").
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then such a motion should be filed for the limited purpose of promoting
a judicial hearing. If, at such a hearing, the defendant fails to make a
valid waiver, then the prosecutor should seek defense counsel's dis-
qualification in order to avoid having a subsequent conviction reversed
on appeal because of defense counsel's conflict of interest.
When a defendant is willing, however, to make a valid waiver of
the right to conflict-free representation, prosecutors must be circum-
spect in deciding whether to seek defense counsel's disqualification,
since the government's selective use of disqualification motions may be
perceived, correctly or not, as an unfair tactic intended to deny defen-
dants access to the best attorney. At minimum, prosecutors' offices
should issue and follow guidelines governing the decision whether to
seek disqualification. Such guidelines should require prosecutors to
provide reasonable cooperation where necessary to reduce the need to
disqualify defense counsel.
In addition, such guidelines should limit disqualification motions to
cases where there is a strong justification for the prosecutor's inter-
vention. For example, disqualification of counsel could appropriately
be sought in certain cases to promote the public perception that the
defendant's trial is being conducted fairly and ethically; but this
rationale would apply only where there is a substantial likelihood that
defense counsel will have a conflict of interest which will significantly
impair his ability to defend the accused. A disqualification motion
would also be appropriate where the government's own investigative
interests or its legitimate prosecutorial interests at trial may be
adversely affected because of defense counsel's conflict.
Finally, prosecutors should be encouraged to state precisely which
interests they are seeking to promote by moving for disqualification.
The adoption and implementation of such guidelines would significantly
diminish cause for skepticism about the prosecution's motives and
thereby contribute to the perception that criminal proceedings are in fact
being conducted fairly and ethically.
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